


School of Theology at Claremont



10017015267

BX  
4721  
G54  
1859



The Library  
of the  
**CLAREMONT**  

---

**SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY**

1325 North College Avenue  
Claremont, CA 91711-3199  
1/800-626-7820





4721  
G 54  
1859

Nov. 1869.

REMARKS

ON A



LETTER IN THE RAMBLER

FOR DECEMBER, 1858,

ENTITLED

“THE PATERNITY OF JANSENISM.”

BY

JOHN GILLOW, S.T.P.

ST. CUTHBERT'S COLLEGE.

LONDON:

THOMAS RICHARDSON AND SON, 147, STRAND;  
9, CAPEL STREET, DUBLIN; AND DERBY.

MDCCLIX.

**LIBRARY**  
**CLAREMONT SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY**  
**1325 N. COLLEGE AVE.**  
**CLAREMONT, CA 91711-3199**

Imprimatur:  
GULIELMUS HAGULSTADENSIS.



## REMARKS,

&c.

---

It is a matter of frequent complaint amongst Catholics that some of the writers in the Rambler indulge with a freedom not warranted by the spirit of the Church, in broaching propositions and views calculated to startle and greatly to offend the Catholic feelings of their readers. In this class of propositions, the assertion that "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism," occupies a prominent place. This assertion was made in the number of the Rambler for August, 1858, p. 135, in these words; "Because St. Thomas died a martyr, we are not tempted to deny that he wavered at Clarendon; nor because St. Augustine was the greatest doctor of the West, need we conceal the fact that he was also the father of Jansenism." In the number of that journal for December, there was attempted a formal defence of the truth of this assertion, in a Letter from the pen of one whose name is supposed to add weight to the cause which it supports. Apparently proud of this novel opinion and of the advocacy obtained in favour of it, some one, we may suppose the Editor of the Rambler, has caused the Letter referred to, to be printed for private circulation, and amongst others, to be addressed even to the heads of our hierarchy. Two letters appeared in the Weekly Register for December 11th, in answer to the Letter in the Rambler; but the editor of that paper, whilst he admitted the justice of the arguments they contained, sided in favour of the assertion of the Rambler, and thus, though no doubt unintentionally, contributed to neutralize whatever effects those letters might otherwise have produced. Thus, as far as these two periodicals can influence the opinions of their readers, the Catholics of England have now been taught to believe that St. Augustine, whom the Church has ever revered as the faithful expounder and strenuous defender of her doctrine on grace, has so misunderstood that doctrine as to lay the foundation of the heresy of Jansenius.

A calumny such as this is, against a great Saint and light of the Church, might indeed have been safely allowed to pass without further notice, did we consider only the effect that it is likely to produce on those who are accustomed to think soundly and with humility on all matters connected with faith. But amongst those to whose devout ears this injurious assertion, and still more the defence of it, have given great offence, there are many who anxiously request to be furnished with a satisfactory answer to the arguments put forth in support of that calumny; and a request, proceeding from a motive so just and pious, ought not to be denied. Again, there may be some who are still attached to a love of novelty, and who indulge a tendency to adhere to private judgment in matters wherein the spirit of the Church ought to be their guide: to these it may be of service to remove the stumbling-block which the novelty of this assertion is calculated to throw in their way.

The writer of these pages has, up to this time, waited in expectation of some more able pen undertaking the task of more amply refuting this charge brought against St. Augustine; but as he cannot hear of anything likely to appear on the subject, he begs to offer the following Remarks in order to supply what many deem to be urgently required.

It is not the object of these Remarks to vindicate the orthodoxy of the great St. Augustine. This has already been done most triumphantly by innumerable divines of the Catholic Church: amongst others by Cardinal Bellarmine and Suarez against Luther and Calvin, by Petavius against Jansenius before the condemnation of the five propositions by Pope Innocent X., and by Tournely against the Jansenists who resisted this sentence of condemnation. It would be insulting to the great body of English Catholics to suppose that they need a repetition of these vindications. They feel with the Church, and consequently they hold in reverence whatever she reveres. As her children they know that St. Augustine is a canonized Saint, a father and doctor of the Church: that the holy mass is celebrated in his honour, and that therein are applied to him those words of Ecclesiasticus: *In medio ecclesiæ aperuit os ejus: et implevit eum Dominus spiritu sapientiæ et intellectus.* They know that his writings have been approved by many popes and fathers of the Church, that his very words have been used in the dogmatic decrees of her approved councils, and that they are cited by all her divines as of the highest patristic authority. St. Thomas in his *Summa* alone, cites them above two thousand five hundred times. With this knowledge, they are not likely to be led to believe, on the authority of the Rambler, that after all, the popes,



fathers, councils, divines and the whole Church have all of them either been deceived themselves, or have been wilful deceivers; that they have been either too ignorant to discover the errors of St. Augustine's teaching, or that they have so shamefully betrayed the divine trust committed to them as, by connivance, to approve of his known errors. They are not likely, then, to be persuaded that he whom the Church has so much desired to honour, was a founder of heresy, the father of Jansenism, and that the Church, while it cherished the father, cast out the child for its father's crime. It is not, then, the object of these Remarks to vindicate the orthodoxy of St. Augustine, but to answer the assertion in the Rambler, that "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism;" and their object will be accomplished if it be shown that the argument of the Letter which attempts to prove that assertion to be true, is as false as it is specious, and is wholly unworthy of the pen of a Catholic divine.

In treating this question it is my purpose to leave nothing unanswered; the reader will therefore find in the quotations nearly the whole of the Letter to which I have undertaken to reply.

To understand the state of the question before us, it is necessary to form a correct and clear idea of the *particular sense* in which the Rambler asserts, and the writer of the Letter supports the assertion, that St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism. This may be arrived at by considering,

I. The sense in which the writer says the assertion was *not* used:

II. The sense in which he says it *was* used:

III. The Jansenistic errors which the writer attributes to St. Augustine.

But since the investigation of these points presupposes a knowledge of the nature of Jansenism, it will be first requisite to offer a brief explanation of that system.

Jansenism is not to be understood to mean a certain number of speculative opinions which a Catholic is at liberty to hold or reject at pleasure; it is a soul-destroying heresy, the essential malice of which is the negation of man's free-will. In this respect it is pure Calvinism. But the Jansenists, unlike Calvin, did not, directly and in express terms, deny free-will. They were wolves within the fold, and artfully strove to elude every measure taken on the part of the Church, to drive them out of it. Had they openly denied free-will in man, they would at once have been cast out from the Church as Calvin was. They, therefore, professed to teach the existence of free-will, whilst *in effect* they denied it. For this end they constructed a theory on grace

which excludes free-will, and a theory on merit which does not require it. They built their theory upon the false principle that man can exercise no control over his motives: that he always, and from necessity, acts in obedience to that motive which is *in itself* the stronger: that two delectations, as motives of opposite tendencies, solicit his consent, viz. divine grace, or the celestial delectation, which inclines him to good, and concupiscence, or the terrestrial delectation, which inclines him to evil, and that, without possessing the power to determine for himself, he yields to the one or to the other accordingly as either is *in itself* the more powerful. This principle, it is easily seen, overthrows all morality in human actions, inasmuch as it destroys free-will, the condition of merit and demerit. Such was the principle of their theory, which they pretended to draw from the teaching of St. Augustine.

The complete enunciation of their system was embodied in five propositions extracted from the *Augustinus* of Jansenius, and these were condemned as heretical by Pope Innocent X. 1653. In these propositions it was maintained that grace, without which neither good can be done nor evil avoided, is not always given even to the virtuous; that when it is not given it is impossible to keep God's commandments, and that when it is given it cannot be resisted. Thus, by teaching the irresistible action of concupiscence on the one hand and of grace on the other, the Jansenists denied *in effect* the existence of free-will. But in order to meet what might be urged as an objection wholly condemnatory of their system, that it overthrew free-will and rendered man incapable of merit or demerit, they further propounded that, for free-will, and consequently for merit or demerit, freedom from compulsion (*libertas a coactione*) alone, and not freedom from necessity, (*libertas a necessitate*) is required; in fact, that to act willingly (*voluntarie*) is to act freely (*libere*). From this it follows that God predestinates men to glory or punishment irrespectively of their merits or demerits, that He wishes the salvation of the predestinated only, and that for these alone Jesus Christ shed His blood and died. These consequences, however, the Jansenists did not openly avow. Had they done so, they would have involved themselves in the heresy and condemnation of Calvin; they, therefore, professed to disclaim them, and strove to evade them by subtle distinctions, and openly admitted no more than the general proposition, that *Christ did not die for all*.

From this explanation of Jansenism it will be seen that the fundamental principle of the system is the *irresistible action of*

*grace*, and that as far as the doctrine of grace is concerned, the consequences of this principle are pure Calvinism.

We come now to inquire as to the sense in which the Rambler asserts that "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism," and,

I. As to that sense in which the writer of the Letter says that the assertion was not used.

There can be only three senses in which the term *father* can be used to express such a relationship on the part of St. Augustine to Jansenism. Firstly, either that St. Augustine taught *formal* error identical with, or at least containing in principle, the heresy of Jansenius; or secondly, that he taught this but as *material* error only; or thirdly, that though he taught no such error at all, yet the true father of Jansenism fraudulently fathered his own child on the saint.

The sense then in which the writer in the Rambler says that the assertion was made, is not the first of these: it was not his intention to assert that St. Augustine taught *formal* error. The author of the Letter says:

"In the first place it is clear from the context that it was not the design of the writer to imply that the great African doctor was the father of Jansenism in the same sense in which one might say that Pelagius was the author of Pelagianism, or Luther the father of Lutheranism. The connection of these men with the doctrines and parties named after them is a real and immediate one; they were the *conscious* and *intentional* originators of them."

Truly no one could suppose that the Rambler ever meant to attach to his assertion the sense which the writer, in these words, repudiates.

It is also very clear that the third sense is not that in which he meant his assertion to be understood. He meant more than to say that the Jansenists, by falsified interpretations of St. Augustine's meaning, strove in bad faith to father their heresy on him. Had he meant no more than this, he would not have placed them in a better position than any other heretics, he would not consequently have differed from other Catholics, nor would there have been any necessity for him to apply to a foreign historian to support his assertion by raking together from writers of the sixteenth and following centuries, all the expressions he could find that he deems disparaging to the teaching of the saint.

There remains therefore only the second of the three different senses in which the assertion of the Rambler can be understood: viz. that St. Augustine *unconsciously* and *unintentionally* taught erroneous doctrine on grace, and that this doctrine contains some or all of the heresies of Jansenius, either explicitly or implicitly:



in other words, that St. Augustine, whom the Church has at all times revered as the great expounder and defender of her doctrine on grace and free-will, did not understand the doctrine of the Church on these points, that he erred through his ignorance, and by his error led Jansenius and his followers into heresy.

But some may perhaps ask; Is not the assertion capable of a fourth interpretation? Do not they who maintain it mean nothing more than that St. Augustine did not err in any matter of *faith*, but only on certain *opinions* tolerated by the Church, and that from these opinions, as from principles, Jansenius deduced his heresy? This, however, cannot be the meaning of their assertion, for it assumes that a heresy, as a conclusion, can be logically drawn from premises which contain only an opinion which the Church tolerates—an assumption utterly repugnant to all principles of sound logic as well as of sound theology.

II. But is this second sense that which the *writers themselves* profess to attach to their assertion? We must examine the explanation which the writer of the Letter gives of the assertion, and which the editor of the Rambler so highly approves.

The writer of the Letter is very intelligible and explicit in stating what he does not mean by the assertion, but his explanation of what he does mean by it is very obscure. Some of his statements seem to imply that Jansenism was fraudulently fathered on St. Augustine, but other statements, at variance with these, clearly show that he means to assert that Jansenism is logically contained in the actual doctrine of the father.

Explaining the meaning of the assertion "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism," the author of the Letter writes:

"All that that passage implied therefore was that Jansenius and his school derived the *elements* of their system from certain writings of the father."

The "*elements* of their system" are of course its first principles. These, it is said, were "derived from"—and therefore are contained in—the writings of the father. But the *system* is heretical, therefore its *elements* must contain those heresies, and must be errors subversive of the faith. The writer is not hardy enough to draw this conclusion; he, therefore, proceeds cautiously, and seeks to explain how the "*elements*" came to be in St. Augustine. His explanation seems to imply that they were *mere opinions*. He says:

"In his dispute with Pelagians and Semipelagians, Augustine did not merely state and defend the universal doctrine of the Church, but in some points went beyond it, and in the matter of predestination and the efficacy of grace, developed in his later writings views which were

peculiar to him, and which he had not held before, and which have at no time been the teaching of the Church."

From the admission here contained that St. Augustine *taught the universal doctrine of the Church*, we are led to infer that the points in which he is said to have gone beyond that doctrine—the views peculiar to him and not taught by the Church—and which formed the "elements" of the system of Jansenius, could contain nothing contrary to faith, nothing subversive of it, nothing, in fine, that could form a legitimate foundation for heresy. In what follows the writer of the Letter seems to go farther, and to teach that from these "elements" the Jansenists drew their system by illogical inferences, shut their eyes to the doctrine of the Church taught by St. Augustine and repugnant to their conclusions, acted altogether with bad faith, and strove, as all Catholics believe they did strive, to father their system on St. Augustine. He proceeds :

"Of these peculiar opinions and explanations the Jansenist party took possession, formed them into a complete and coherent system, and drew conclusions from the premises in their own way. Such portions of the doctrine of the Church as are to be found in the earlier works of St. Augustine, and partly also in his later writings, were either rendered subordinate to these dogmas (of absolute election and reprobation, and of the infallible or irresistible action of grace—*adjutorium quo*), or they were ignored or explained away. In this, and in no other way, did that which we call Jansenism take its rise."

If, in this passage, instead of the word *dogmas* he had written *opinions*, and had wholly omitted the important words slipped into the parenthesis, and which a reader might easily pass over unnoticed, supposing them to contain nothing repugnant to the explanation into which they seem as if accidentally introduced, he would have afforded a conclusive refutation of the assertion that he undertakes to justify. He would have shown that St. Augustine was not the father of Jansenism; for he accuses the Jansenists of making the foundation or "elements" of their system, what he calls the peculiar opinions and explanations of St. Augustine, and not the principles which he, in common with the Catholic Church, taught as doctrines of Faith: the doctrines of faith he accuses them of ignoring or explaining away to make them subordinate to these supposed peculiar views and explanations. But in this they were evidently acting with bad faith and a heretical spirit. Again he accuses them of proceeding illogically from their principles or "elements;" for if they had proceeded logically there would have been nothing in their mode to characterise as peculiar to them—nothing to provoke the



expression: they “drew conclusions from the premises in their own way.” He thus accuses them of fathering their heresy on St. Augustine.

With this apparently orthodox explanation of the origin of Jansenism before us, he confirms his position thus:

“In this and in no other way did that which we call Jansenism take its rise. This can be denied by no theologian who has studied the two things, Jansenism and the works of St. Augustine, accurately and in the sources themselves, and who has not derived his notions of the one and the other from mere compendia.”

After this exposition of the paternity of Jansenism, and the dogmatism with which he concludes it, we should hardly have expected to find that this theologian next proceeds most explicitly to deny that which he says *no theologian can deny*, and to establish that Jansenism had its “elements” in errors against faith found in the actual teaching of St. Augustine, and in the sense intended by that father; that Jansenius constructed his system by logical inferences from those “elements;” that this was done in the most perfect good faith; that the *Augustinus* of Jansenius is a true exposition of those passages of the father on which the system is built, and that the same good faith, and accurate knowledge of St. Augustine must be attributed to the rest of the Jansenistic faction. How far this is true—how far this is the scope and aim of the whole of the Letter from the last word of this part which the writer has devoted to the explanation of the origin of Jansenism, to the very end of the Letter—I shall now proceed to examine.

In the sentence which immediately follows the explanation above quoted, he draws from it an inference which is directly opposed to the apparent spirit of the explanation itself, and which may be said to form the proposition or *Thesis* which the rest of the Letter is employed to establish. He says:

“From this” (explanation) “however it appears to follow that Jansenius and his school were not altogether in the wrong when they proudly called themselves the disciples of St. Augustine, and when they wrote voluminous works to prove the conformity of their theology with that of the bishop of Hippo.”

If, by bad faith and bad logic, they built up a system of heresy on the mere tolerated opinions of the holy bishop, as this writer has led us by his previous explanation to suppose, they were decidedly altogether in the wrong, in calling themselves the disciples of St. Augustine; but if, as in this portion of the Letter it is maintained, the “elements” of their system were

doctrinal errors of the father, the conclusions drawn from them legitimate, and the good faith of those who drew them unquestionable, then their claims to be his disciples were just, and St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism. Of these three suppositions by far the most important and the most decisive of the question is the first. Were then these "elements" errors of faith or were they not? If the former, the cause of St. Augustine falls to the ground: if the latter, then the Jansenists are convicted of having fraudulently fathered their heresy upon him. According to the statements of the author of the Letter, these "elements" are *errors against faith*.

III. To assure ourselves of this, we must examine the third point above enumerated, viz. the Jansenistic errors which the writer attributes to St. Augustine. For this purpose we must now subject to a close examination the few parenthetic words above noticed in the passage already quoted. In these few words he expressly states what, in his mind, are the "elements" of Jansenism contained in St. Augustine's writings. He calls them "these dogmas (of absolute election and reprobation, and of the infallible or irresistible action of grace—*adjutorium quo*.)"

In these few words there are implied five propositions:

1. That St. Augustine taught the dogma of absolute election.
2. That St. Augustine taught the dogma of absolute reprobation.
3. That St. Augustine taught the dogma of the irresistible action of grace.
4. That infallible action of grace is the same thing as irresistible action of grace.
5. That this infallible or irresistible grace is the grace spoken of by St. Augustine under the term *adjutorium quo*.

Here we have this historian's theory of the foundation of Jansenism as based upon the teaching of St. Augustine. A brief examination of these five propositions will show that he has laid a foundation broad and deep enough not only for the secure erection of Jansenism, but of open Calvinism, if not of actual infidelity.

1. His first implied proposition is "that St. Augustine taught the dogma of absolute election."

The use of the term *absolute*, as it is here employed, can only mean the absence of all condition, and consequently it excludes man's free-will from entering, in any way, as a condition in his election. The meaning, therefore, of this first proposition is, that God elects, and consequently predestinates, men to glory irrespectively of their merits. This evidently excludes the Catholic doctrine that glory is given as the reward of merit. Now this doctrine

of the Church was never denied by any school of Catholic theology. Calvin denied it, and therefore this first proposition is Calvinistic. Hence it is evident that the writer here attributes to St. Augustine an error against faith.

Now St. Augustine never taught this doctrine. On the contrary his doctrine is that merit is the effect of grace, and *glory the reward of merit*. *Epist. II. ad Maced. cap. 4.* He writes: "His igitur virtutibus divinitus impertitis et bona vita nunc agitur et postea præmium ejus.....Hic enim sunt eædem virtutes in actu, ibi in effectu, hic in opere ibi in mercede, hic in officio ibi in fine." The same teaching is repeated several times in this epistle alone, and innumerable times in his other writings.

2. The second implied proposition is "that St. Augustine taught the dogma of absolute reprobation."

As the term *absolute* here also still bears the same meaning, this proposition asserts that, according to St. Augustine, God predestinates men to eternal pain irrespectively of their sins. Hitherto no one, except the shameless heretics of Calvin's sect, ever dared to attribute such blasphemy to the holy Doctor.

St. Augustine teaches the contrary in a hundred places. *Cont. Julian III. cap. 18.* he says: "Bonus est Deus, justus est Deus; potest aliquos sine bonis meritis liberare, quia bonus est: non potest quemquam sine malis meritis damnare, quia justus est."

Even the Jansenists did not *teach* this doctrine of absolute reprobation, nor is it to be found in the five propositions condemned by Innocent X.

3. The third implied proposition asserts "that St. Augustine taught the dogma of the irresistible action of grace."

This means that the will under the influence of grace is compelled to act by a necessity which it cannot resist. Now this is the very doctrine of Jansenius condemned as heretical, &c. in the second and fourth propositions extracted from his *Augustinus*. It is the very FIRST "ELEMENT" of Jansenism, and its development, as shown above, entails all the conclusions of the system. The negation of free-will in man, with its awful consequences, flows directly from it. If this assertion were true, St. Augustine would indeed, in the fullest sense, be the father of Jansenism.

But St. Augustine never taught any such doctrine. On the contrary, he continually teaches that grace imposes no necessity on the will to act, or, in other words, that man's free-will can resist the motion of grace. His work *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, has this for its express object. He commences thus: "Propter eos qui hominis liberum arbitrium sic prædicant et defendunt, ut Dei gratiam qua vocamur ad eum, et a nostris malis meritis

liberamur, et per quam bona merita comparamus quibus ad vitam perveniamus æternam, negare audeant et conentur auferre, multa jam disseruimus, quantum nobis Dominus donare dignatus est. Sed quoniam sunt quidam, qui sic gratiam Dei defendunt, ut negent hominis liberum arbitrium: aut quando gratia defenditur, negari existiment liberum arbitrium; hinc aliquid scribere, compellente mutua charitate, curavi."

4. In the fourth implied proposition it is declared, that *infallible* action of grace is the same thing as *irresistible* action of grace. This can only mean that if grace infallibly produce its effect, it must do so by an irresistible action on the will.

In the previous proposition the writer of the Letter has attributed to St. Augustine the Jansenistic doctrine of *irresistible grace*; in this he justifies that imputation, by admitting as true the *false principle* by which the Jansenists strove to infer that heresy from the teaching of St. Augustine.

It is unquestionable that St. Augustine teaches that the grace, afterwards distinguished in theology by the term *efficacious*, is infallible in producing its effect. The Jansenists held that if grace produce its effect infallibly, it can only do so by exerting an irresistible action on the will. Hence they inferred that St. Augustine teaches that grace is *irresistible*. The theologians of the Church exposed this fallacy of the Jansenists by pointing out the distinction between infallibility and irresistibleness: they showed that the infallibility of the effect by no means implies irresistibleness in the manner of producing it: they showed that no contradiction is implied in grace being able to work its effect infallibly by the cooperation of man's free-will, and consequently that the infallibility of grace is compatible with its being resistible. They further showed that St. Augustine never confounds the ideas expressed by the terms *infallible* and *irresistible*; that although he repeatedly insists on the infallibility of the effect which God efficaciously wills to obtain by grace, yet he insists with equal positiveness, that the effect is obtained by the free cooperation of the will of man, and that man has always the power to resist and reject the grace. But how infallibility in the effect is thus compatible with the resistibleness in the manner of producing it, St. Augustine does not attempt to explain; he regards it as a mystery hidden in the depths of the secret counsels of God. Many Catholic theologians, however, have attempted to explain it, and the different theories adopted for its explanation have given rise to the opposite school opinions of the Thomists and Congruists. But as the advocates of each system still continue to reproach the opposite opinion as unsuccessful in explaining the difficulty, we must admit with St. Augustine that it is an inex-

plicable mystery. Still all Catholic theologians, whether partisans of these school opinions or not, teach with St. Augustine, that efficacious grace produces its effect infallibly, but that the free-will of man can nevertheless resist it.

The Jansenists, however, denied that infallible grace could be resisted by the will, and this denial was a *primary principle* in their system of heresy. If this their false principle be admitted to be true, it thence inevitably follows that St. Augustine does teach the Jansenistic heresy *that grace is irresistible*, and that consequently, in the strictest sense, "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism." And this is probably all that the writer of the Letter intended to establish by admitting this Jansenistic principle.

But, as I have already said, St. Augustine is not alone in teaching that the grace, called by theologians *efficacious*, works its effect infallibly. His doctrine upon this point is that of all Catholic theologians; consequently they are all equally the teachers of Jansenism. Again, they do not teach this doctrine as an opinion open to question, but as the only doctrine reconcileable with sound faith and sound logic. Of this the Jansenists were fully aware, and they did not fail to turn it to advantage. They took from the theologians this avowal that efficacious grace is infallible, but they derided the distinction between infallibility and irresistibleness, and maintained in consequence that efficacious grace is irresistible. By so doing they became heretics, and as such the Church condemned them, and thereby justified, at least by implication, the theologians in the validity of their distinction between infallible and irresistible grace; for the Jansenistic heresy is an immediate consequence of the denial of that distinction. From this it will be seen that to deny that distinction is the common and exclusive characteristic of the partisans of that sect.

Surely the writer of the Letter in the Rambler could not have reflected upon this when he made the fatal admission implied in the words "infallible or irresistible action of grace." Yet that he should have overlooked, I do not say *ignored*, a distinction so essential and so familiar to every young student in theology who understands even his *compendium*, is a thing wholly inexplicable: for an accurate divine it is impossible. Were any one ignorant of this distinction, or unable to appreciate its validity, he would be utterly incapacitated from speaking on the doctrine of grace: he would not only be unable to understand the nature of the controversy between the Church and Jansenism, but he could not understand the doctrine of the Church on the questions of grace, free-will, merit, and predestination: he would prove him-



self ignorant even of the first elements of mental philosophy and ethics. To understand this distinction and still to deny it, is the exclusive characteristic of a Jansenist.

I know not in what spirit, whether by inadvertence or otherwise, the writer of the Letter denies this distinction between infallibility and irresistibleness; but whatever be that spirit, as a matter of fact, the denial of it cedes the whole question in dispute to the Jansenists. For on this distinction we depend for a refutation of the chief arguments adduced in support of their heretical doctrine of irresistible grace, and if the distinction in question be invalid, those arguments cannot be refuted. Were a reason required to account for the extraordinary fact of a Catholic divine committing so fatal an oversight, I could only reply that it is a thing not likely to happen except perhaps to one "*who has studied the two things, Jansenism and the writings of St. Augustine, accurately and in the sources themselves*;" in other words, who, in reading the writings of St. Augustine, has followed Jansenius for his interpreter, deeming it superfluous to consult the divines of the Catholic Church.

In these observations I have set down the confusion of the terms *infallible* and *irresistible* to the account of the writer of the Letter. For nothing is more unnatural or forced than the only other meaning of which they could be supposed capable, viz. that by the words "of the infallible or irresistible action of grace," the writer meant to affirm that St. Augustine fell into the error of confounding these two terms, and taught that grace, if infallible, is therefore irresistible. For not only is this directly contrary to the fact, as has been already said, but it is absurd, inasmuch as the controversy about these terms had no existence in his days. It was not till the Jansenists confounded the terms, that the controversy upon the distinction between them gained its celebrity. That it is the writer of the Letter himself who calls infallible grace irresistible, is confirmed in a subsequent part of the Letter wherein its author is unfolding his *own views* upon the results of the controversy with the Jansenists. He says: p. 369.

"It convinced them" (the theologians) "that no system could maintain itself before the tribunal of the Church, or could effectually defend Christianity against the assaults of an unbelieving philosophy, which by assuming an absolute predestination, with its natural and inevitable consequence, the particular, and therefore *irresistible* and *infallible* action of grace," &c.

In this passage the relation indicated between the terms *irresistible* and *infallible* is that which they bear in the *writer's own mind*.

But after all, if it should still be maintained that the writer really means by the expression to attribute to St. Augustine the error of confounding the terms *infallible* and *irresistible*, and to make him assert that infallibility implies irresistibleness, I reply that in so doing he opposes himself to the whole body of Catholic divines, and that he cannot produce from St. Augustine a single passage to justify this imputation.

5. The fifth implied proposition declares that this infallible or *irresistible grace*, is the grace spoken of by St. Augustine under the term *adjutorium quo*.

In this the writer of the Letter adopts the Jansenistic interpretation of a certain passage in St. Augustine's work, *De Correctione et Gratia*, cap. xii. In the controversy with the Jansenists, the meaning of the term *adjutorium quo*, as there used by St. Augustine, is a question of the highest importance. According to Jansenius, St. Augustine in this passage expressly teaches the primary article of his system—the doctrine of irresistible grace,—and the writer of the Letter, by implying that the term *adjutorium quo* signifies *irresistible* grace, equivalently affirms that the interpretation given by Jansenius of that passage is the true interpretation.

In the extracts from the Letter which the reader has already seen, its author has given us to understand that the doctrine of irresistible grace is the prevalent doctrine taught by St. Augustine “in his later works.” This doctrine he identifies, without any qualification, with the term *adjutorium quo*. He does the same in a subsequent part of the Letter, p. 368. where he says that Bossuet “rejects one of St. Augustine's chief doctrines, the distinction of the two states before and after the fall, and the corresponding *adjutorium sine quo*, and *adjutorium quo*.” Should any one from these positive statements be led to suppose that this distinction, as expressed by these terms, is frequently used by St. Augustine, that the meaning of these terms is well defined, and that the doctrine conveyed by them cannot be a matter of dispute, he will probably be surprised to learn that in the ten folio volumes which his writings occupy, the distinction in question occurs solely in the passage above referred to; that the passage in which it occurs is exceedingly obscure; that its elucidation has been the object of numerous and elaborate dissertations, and that the interpretations given of its meaning are very various

However, notwithstanding its obscurity, and probably for this very reason, it was seized upon by Jansenius and made the chief stay of his system. He declared it to be the very KEY to the writings of St. Augustine, and instead of adopting the only rational

mode of interpretation—that of explaining obscure passages by others which express an author's teaching on the same subject clearly and definitely—he made all the doctrinal teaching of the father on grace, subordinate to this one obscure passage, and to the heretical doctrine which he based upon his interpretation of it. Of this passage he says: “Hæc est enim *VERA CLAVIS*, qua aditus in scripta ejus (*S. Augustini*) aperiendus est, et sine qua qui ea molitur ingredi, velut cæcus palpabit in meridie, ac tot tantisque difficultatibus implicabitur, ut quasi monstris occurrentibus territus, Augustinum tanquam perplexitatibus, imo, ut quidam ausi sunt dicere, mille erroribus refertum aversetur. Qui vero, jacto isto fundamento, *DISTINCTIONEM ILLAM*, velut *filum in labyrintho* scriptorum ejus secutus fuerit, mirabilis ei occurrit contextus rerum: respondent extrema primis, media utrisque, omnia omnibus.”—*Lib. de gratia primi Hominis et Angelorum, cap. xvii.*

The assertion in the Letter that the doctrine which was drawn by Jansenius from the passage herein referred to, is “one of St. Augustine's chief doctrines,” is in perfect harmony with this view of Jansenius.

Although, among Catholic divines, there is a great diversity of opinion as to the meaning intended by St. Augustine by the term *adjutorium quo*, yet they unanimously reject the interpretation which makes it signify irresistible grace. Still this interpretation, urged by Jansenius, is adopted, without any limitation, by the writer of the Letter, and he does not even deem it necessary to inform us that the passage is capable of interpretations in conformity with the doctrine of the Church.

We have hitherto been investigating what errors of Jansenius the writer of the Letter attributes to St. Augustine. This investigation has proved that the “elements of their system,” which the writer says “were derived from certain writings of the father,” and which, according to him, consisted in “these dogmas (of absolute election and reprobation, and of the infallible or irresistible action of grace—*adjutorium quo*,)” contain everything that the Jansenists could possibly desire. That they do so has been shown in this brief examination of the five propositions implied in the above enumeration of those “elements.” The fundamental article of the Jansenists, viz., that St. Augustine teaches that the action of grace is irresistible, is affirmed in the third of those propositions: their false principle which contains that fundamental article, and holds that all infallible grace is irresistible, is declared, in the fourth proposition, to be a true principle; or if this be not the writer's meaning, it is, at all events, declared to be a principle held by St. Augustine: lastly,

their interpretation of St. Augustine's term *adjutorium quo*, which attributes to him the direct teaching of the doctrine of irresistible grace, the fifth proposition affirms to be the true interpretation. Could any Jansenist desire a better advocacy for his system than is furnished in these three propositions? But the admissions contained in the first and second propositions are still more astonishing. In them, as we have already seen, it is affirmed that St. Augustine teaches the doctrines of absolute election and reprobation; in other words, that he teaches absolute Calvinism.

It has now been established that the writer of the Letter, in his explanation of the sense in which the Rambler asserted that St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism, gives two views of the paternity of Jansenism at variance with each other; that the general tenor of his explanation represents Jansenism as fraudulently fathered on St. Augustine, but that a few words introduced in the form of parenthesis, and professing to enumerate the "elements" of Jansenism as contained in St. Augustine, represent that father as actually teaching not only the heresies of Jansenius but also those of Calvin.

We must next consider which of these two opposite views is confirmed in the rest of the Letter. I have already said that, from the part of the Letter devoted to the explanation of the paternity of Jansenism to the very end, its entire scope and tendency is to represent Jansenism as legitimately drawn from the doctrine taught and intended by St. Augustine.

In proof of this it will be amply sufficient for the present to select four passages, in which the writer of the Letter more explicitly expresses his opinion upon the relation between St. Augustine's doctrine and the heresy of Jansenius. The first of these is found in the statement of the argument of the Letter; the second is found in his quotations, in which he makes the writers cited by him attribute to St. Augustine doctrine which they do not attribute to him; the third is the exposition of his own view of the system of the Jansenists, and the fourth is his representation of the characters of the leaders of the sect.

1. The chief argument that he adopts to justify the assertion that "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism," consists solely of an appeal to certain writers. He heads the citations from these with a statement of the argument which forms the proposition in support of which the authorities are adduced; in this proposition, therefore, he declares what the doctrines are which, in his view, the Jansenists drew from St. Augustine. The argument is thus stated:

"We shall find in the whole Church, from the sixteenth century

downwards, a perpetual protest against Augustine's later theory of predestination, and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will, sometimes loudly and distinctly uttered, sometimes with more forbearance and reserve, according to the position and character of individual writers."

How far the truth of this proposition is supported by the writers who are cited in proof of it, will be a matter of investigation hereafter; my present object is to call attention to the doctrines here attributed to St. Augustine. In this proposition we see clearly the sense in which the writer justifies the assertion of the Rambler that "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism;" for it formally attributes to St. Augustine the substance of the five propositions above discussed; and he supports himself in this by what he represents to be "a perpetual protest through the whole Church from the sixteenth century downwards." In this proposition St. Augustine's theory of predestination, before called "absolute election and reprobation," is declared to involve, as a consequence, the doctrine of irresistible grace. Further it contains an open avowal that the same theory of predestination and irresistible grace excludes free-will. An *explicit assertion* that St. Augustine's doctrine destroys free-will was the only point wanting in the former "elements" to complete the system, not indeed as avowed by the Jansenists, who pretended to admit free-will, but as developed in its legitimate consequences. Here the want is formally supplied.

2. Further confirmation of the meaning of the writer in his defence of the assertion in the Rambler is found in the statements attributed to his authorities, but which, as will be seen when those authorities are considered, do not at all bear out his representations of them. Hence we can only regard such statements as a peculiar mode, adopted by the writer of the Letter, of expressing, with more emphasis, his own convictions. I will illustrate what I mean by instancing his citation from Bossuet. He says, p. 368.

"I need hardly say that Bossuet did not incline towards Jansenism, in spite of his esteem and friendship for some of the leaders of the party, and especially Arnauld. The recently published journal of his Secretary, the Abbé Le Dieu, places this beyond doubt; and in his *Traité du libre Arbitre* he rejects, on Thomist principles, one of St. Augustine's chief doctrines, the distinction of the two states before and after the fall, and the corresponding *adjutorium sine quo* and *adjutorium quo*."

The writer adduces as a proof that Bossuet did not incline to



Jansenism, that he rejects one of St. Augustine's chief doctrines! But unless that chief doctrine of St. Augustine were Jansenism, Bossuet's refutation of it would be no defence from the imputation of inclining to Jansenism; and thus he assumes that St. Augustine's doctrine on the graces, corresponding with the two states, before and after the fall, is Jansenism. But the point to which I wish particularly to direct the reader's attention, is the use that the writer here makes of the assumption that Jansenism is really the doctrine of St. Augustine.

From the words just cited, I was led to expect that in the place referred to (chap. v.) Bossuet had undertaken a formal refutation of the doctrine of the distinction between these two states, and of the corresponding graces expressed by the terms *adjutorium sine quo*, and *adjutorium quo*; I expected to find that Bossuet had refuted this as being the doctrine of St. Augustine. But on referring to the place my surprise was great. I found indeed that Bossuet is there refuting one of Jansenius's chief doctrines, the distinction between the two states, and the corresponding graces and powers of the will; he is refuting the theory that, whereas the will had the power to act *freely* under the action of grace before the fall, it has now, since the fall, no more than the power to act *willingly* in supernatural things, being subject to the action of irresistible grace. But Bossuet, in the course of this refutation, makes no mention of St. Augustine or his writings, nor the remotest allusion to the terms *adjutorium sine quo* and *adjutorium quo*: there is nothing, beyond the doctrine itself, to indicate whose system he is refuting. But he does say, when he has concluded the refutation of these Jansenistic doctrines, that he has no intention to attribute them to St. Augustine. For he concludes the chapter with these words: "Au reste, nous n' avons pas entrepris dans cette Dissertation, d'examiner les sentiments de Saint Augustin, a qui on attribue l'opinion que je viens de rapporter; parce qu' encore qu'il y eut beaucoup de choses a dire sur cela, nous n' avons pas eu dessein de disputer ici par autorité." Hence it is the writer of the Letter, and not Bossuet, who calls that Jansenistic doctrine "one of St. Augustine's chief doctrines." It is he, and not Bossuet, who says that this Jansenistic doctrine of irresistible grace, which Bossuet is refuting, is indicated by St. Augustine under the term *adjutorium quo*.

How is this conduct of the writer to be accounted for? I can imagine no other solution than what is to be found in the convictions existing in the writer's own mind. He must hold as a fixed conviction, that the doctrines of irresistible grace, and the denial of free-will, are the actual doctrines of St. Augustine, and seeing that Bossuet is refuting these, he asserts positively and

as a matter of course, that "Bossuet rejects one of St. Augustine's chief doctrines." Bossuet does not say that he is refuting Jansenism; yet no Catholic theologian would hesitate to say: *Bossuet is refuting one of Jansenius's chief doctrines*; because it would be a fixed conviction in his own mind that the doctrine of irresistible grace, and the consequent negation of free-will, was taught by Jansenius, and is the specific doctrine of the sect. But there would be this difference between them; the writer stands alone among Catholics, in his conviction, whereas the Catholic theologian would have with him the common consent of all. Moreover, while Bossuet declares that it is not his intention to refute St. Augustine, he has not said the same of the Jansenists. These circumstances would create a great difference between them, and make the conduct of the writer appear somewhat singular. There will be occasion hereafter to notice more examples of this peculiar use of the authorities whom he cites, by which, as if unconsciously, he makes them speak according to his own peculiar convictions. He could not indeed adopt a more emphatic mode of declaring what his own convictions are.

3. The third passage which I adduce in confirmation of the meaning of the Rambler's assertion as justified by the Letter, occurs at page 369, and is one of considerable length. In this passage the writer unfolds his view of the system of Jansenius and of the mutual dependance of its various parts. He concludes this exposition with a dogmatic declaration that,

"Jansenism did not become a dangerous heresy by attributing to St. Augustine a system arbitrarily conceived and totally foreign to the great doctor."

He then proceeds to prove the truth of this declaration by an argument *a priori* based on what he is pleased to represent as the excellent characters of the leaders in this heresy, from which he concludes that Jansenius and the other partisans of the system could not be deceived in their interpretation of St. Augustine's meaning. The passage is introduced in illustration of the beneficial effects which, he says, resulted to the Church from the controversy with the Jansenists, and is as follows:

"It opened the eyes of those theologians who were not held captive by the systems of the schools, whether Thomism, Augustinianism, or Congruism, and convinced them that no system could maintain itself before the tribunal of the Church, or could effectually defend Christianity against the assaults of an unbelieving philosophy, which, by assuming an absolute predestination, with its natural and inevitable consequence, the particular, and therefore irresistible and infallible

action of grace, shakes that which is the pillar of all true religion, the free-will and moral responsibility of man; and in reality represents as the true cause of the eternal damnation of great part of mankind not the will of the creature, but the will of God, who places or leaves His creatures in a position brought about independently of their own personal will, in which they are absolutely incapable of doing anything for their own salvation. Jansenism did not become a dangerous heresy by attributing to St. Augustine a system arbitrarily conceived and totally foreign to the great doctor."

In these words the writer of the Letter has fully developed in a regular series of premises and conclusions, his view of the heresy of Jansenism. According to him the construction of the system is as follows :

1. Its *first element* is absolute predestination, including, of course, as before formally stated, election and reprobation. 2. From this follows particular grace. 3. Consequently grace is irresistible and infallible. 4. Hence man has neither free-will, nor moral responsibility. 5. And lastly, the will of God and not that of man, is the true cause of the eternal damnation of the great portion of mankind.

Of this system he says :—

"Jansenism did not become a dangerous heresy by attributing to St. Augustine a system arbitrarily conceived and totally foreign to the great doctor."

Whatever, therefore, I have hitherto accused the writer of attributing to St. Augustine, all is here distinctly repeated by him, with the explicit addition of that impious blasphemy assigned as the final consequence of the system. To attribute in one unqualified declaration the whole of this system of blasphemous heresy to St. Augustine, would be a boldness of assertion from which the writer could not fail to shrink. Accordingly the insertion of the qualifying word *totally*, seems to modify somewhat the barefacedness of his declaration, and to imply that there may be some part of the system that is "foreign to the great doctor." But this modification is only apparent; it affects only the mode of expression, not the substance of the imputation expressed. For the whole series of doctrines is made to depend on their first principle, absolute predestination. Allowing, then, that this doctrine is taught by St. Augustine, the whole system follows of necessity from his teaching. If, however, the system be not "*totally* foreign to the great doctor," some portion of it must be in accordance with his teaching. Now, according to the belief of the writer, that portion can be no other than the doctrine which it is the object of the whole argument of the Letter to

fasten upon St. Augustine. But that doctrine is the doctrine of absolute predestination; for nothing short of an absolute predestination can involve as consequences the irresistibility of grace and the denial of free will. And he has adduced twenty-one authorities in order to establish that,

“Through the whole Church there has been, from the sixteenth century downwards, a perpetual protest against Augustine’s later theory of predestination, and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will.”

This doctrine, therefore, of absolute predestination, being attributed so emphatically to St. Augustine, the whole system dependent upon it must be conformable to his teaching.

Before I proceed to the fourth confirmation of the meaning of the Rambler’s assertion, I must beg to call the reader’s attention to the extraordinary statement with which he has introduced the above detailed exposition of the system of Jansenism. He says:—

“Like other heresies, Jansenism rendered an important service to the Church through the discussions brought about, in its later period, by the Bull *Unigenitus*. Just as Arianism was of incalculable use, by impelling the Church to a more accurate definition and a more complete development of the dogma of the Son and of His relation to the Father, and by proving to divines that many expressions which the ante-Nicene Fathers do not hesitate to use were exceptional, because of the consequences involved in them, so Jansenism too, in spite of the unspeakable injury which it inflicted on the Church, especially in France and the Netherlands, had a very beneficial influence.”

Now, what was that beneficial influence? Speaking of that impious system of heresy, including absolute predestination, irresistible grace, denial of man’s free-will and moral responsibility, and the imputation to God of man’s eternal damnation, he says that

“It opened the eyes of those theologians, who were not held captive by the systems of the schools, whether Thomism, Augustinianism, or Congruism, and convinced them that no” (such) “system could maintain itself before the tribunal of the Church, or could effectually defend Christianity against the assaults of an unbelieving philosophy.”

Theologians must have had their eyes strangely sealed if they could not see the opposition between such a system of heresy and the doctrines of the Church, or the harmony existing between it and infidelity, until the Controversy with the Jansenists, and that too in its later period, “through the discussions brought about by the Bull *Unigenitus*,” issued in 1713 came to open

their eyes and show them the light? Truly, the cure of a state of blindness like this confers on the Jansenists the credit of a work in the highest degree miraculous. Did, then, theology do nothing to oppose these same heresies when broached by Luther and Calvin? Had theology no part in the discussions that brought about the condemnation of Baius and Jansenius? But it seems that it was only the select among theologians who were able to benefit by this miraculous cure—those namely “who were not held captive by the systems of the schools, whether Thomism, Augustinianism, or Congruism!” So then the partisans of all these systems, that is, nine-tenths of the theologians, still remained blind, and we may suppose, remain so to this day; for not even the discussions about the Bull *Unigenitus* were able, it seems, to conquer the dulness of their intellects, and force upon them the conviction that such heresies were unable to withstand the tribunal of the Church, or to defend Christianity against infidelity! And in this blindness and obstinacy the Thomists, Augustinians and Congruists are all equally and hopelessly implicated!

The reader will no doubt see other incongruities into which this random way of writing has here betrayed its author, but I omit them in order to pass on to the fourth confirmation of the meaning attached to the Rambler's assertion.

4. This confirmation is found in the proof with which the writer of the Letter next proceeds to justify his having attributed the Jansenistic system, as developed by him, to St. Augustine. And this brings us to consider also with what sincerity, and with what logical accuracy the Jansenists are represented by the writer of the Letter to have “formed these elements into a complete and coherent system.” But from what we have now seen of his view of the connection between St. Augustine's doctrine and Jansenism, there could be no inducement for the Jansenists to be guilty of bad faith in interpreting St. Augustine's meaning, and certainly no great necessity for acuteness in reasoning, when, as the writer would have it believed, St. Augustine teaches more in accordance with their views than they even required. It will not, therefore, excite surprise to find that he now wholly exculpates them from the imputation he had cast upon them before, of building up their system in bad faith and with bad logic, and that, by way of reparation for the slight cast upon them before he had prepared his readers to endure all that he had to say in their favour, he breaks forth into a warm eulogy of the piety, zeal, learning, industry, good faith and logical accuracy possessed or displayed by the leaders of this heresy, and finally infers, as the issue of this panegyric, that such men could



not be deceived in their interpretation of the mind of St. Augustine.

He proceeds :

“Jansenism did not become a dangerous heresy by attributing to St. Augustine a system arbitrarily conceived and totally foreign to the great doctor. Let us reflect for a moment on what Jansenius was, and what he wanted. He was a pious, learned, and zealous bishop, who had upheld the cause of the Church against Protestants with distinguished success ; who, after studying for thirty years the writings of St. Augustine, had at last produced a work which, when dying, he submitted to the judgment of the Roman See, and in which he cites on every page the words of the master, and desires only to work out his ideas and to reduce them to scientific unity and a systematic form. That such a man, whose good faith cannot be called in question, should have failed utterly in the labour of his whole life, and have entirely mistaken the doctrine of St. Augustine, is hardly credible ; nor can it be believed that men so distinguished for their piety, genius, and learning,—men who, setting their Jansenism aside, were the ornaments of the Church, and literature of France, such as Arnauld, Nicole, Tillemont, Hermant, Sacy, &c.,—could be deluded by the book of Jansenius alone. These men, who, it must not be forgotten, were, next to Bossuet, the best, the most dreaded, and the most victorious antagonists of the Protestant errors, were fully in earnest with their claim to the title of disciples of St. Augustine. They studied his writings daily ; Arnauld, for instance, knew some of them almost by heart ; and yet they are supposed to have been too obstinately blind to see through the pretended deception of Jansenius. He that can believe this, must at least admit that the whole history of the human mind presents no instance of a similar delusion. Jansenism was condemned and cast out of the Church because it clung blindly to the authority of a single man—holy indeed, and singularly gifted, but yet liable to error ; and because, despising all others in comparison with him, it tried to compel the whole Church to submit unconditionally to his single dictation—because it claimed for the great Bishop a position in the Church against which he himself had protested, and which he had positively refused for himself as well as for every other writer.”

This long argument may be abbreviated thus : Jansenius was a holy and learned Bishop, and a defender of the Faith against Protestants ; the work of his life was to study the writings of St. Augustine, and to develop his doctrine faithfully in his *Augustinus* ; therefore he could not mistake that doctrine : Arnauld, Nicole, Tillemont, and the other advocates of the system, were also learned and virtuous defenders of the Church ; they too studied earnestly the works of the father, independently of the book of Jansenius, therefore they could not be deceived when

they adopted the same interpretation. But St. Augustine, although holy and singularly gifted, was yet liable to error. The fault therefore of the Jansenists consisted in their obstinately adhering to his doctrine, and in despising that of other writers, which was in opposition to that of St. Augustine. For this they were condemned and cast out of the Church. They were, therefore, cast out as the disciples of St. Augustine. It is consequently right to assert that "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism."

The state of the question is now clearly before us; we understand the full meaning and purpose of this scandalous proposition. It asserts that the heretical doctrines of Jansenius, in their natural sense, and as intended by their author, are contained in the writings and actual teaching of St. Augustine, not indeed as formal errors, but as propounded in good faith in that holy father's ignorance of the doctrines of the Church. It asserts that Jansenius and his party—men of piety and learning, the defenders of the Faith against Protestants, and the ornaments of literature and the Church—drew their system legitimately and in perfect good faith from this its pretended natural source, and that the *Augustinus* of Jansenius is a faithful exposition of those portions of St. Augustine's writings on which their system is founded. This is the sense in which the assertion, "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism," is defended by the Rambler's advocate; this is the sense in which the Editor of the Rambler publishes that defence, and presents it to his readers as an incontrovertible justification of his scandalous assertion; this is the sense in which, for greater publicity, he (for I suppose it was he,) caused that defence to be printed separately, and to be addressed, amongst others, even to the English Bishops.

So repulsive to every Catholic mind and heart is this shameless assertion, that it needs only to be stated to be at once rejected as a false and injurious calumny against the great Saint and Doctor of the Church, and as a flagrant attack upon the integrity of the Church itself, as the means divinely appointed for the preservation of the purity of the Faith. These remarks, then, might here be consistently brought to a close. But some may wish to know how the arguments by which the assertion is attempted to be proved, are to be answered. For the satisfaction of such I will follow the writer of the Letter through the course of his reasoning on this subject.

And first as to the argument founded upon the commendation of the Jansenists contained in the long extract already presented to the reader—it is my firm belief that up to the present time there

has never proceeded from the pen of one, who was not himself a partisan, an eulogy of the Jansenists to be compared with this. Such praise given to heresiarchs and their obstinate abettors cannot be without great scandal to the Church. Surely the crime of heresy must be regarded by some as a very venial offence!

But what is the value of this eulogy as a proof that the Jansenists could not be mistaken in their interpretation of St. Augustine's meaning?

Had the writings of St. Augustine been long ago lost, and had we no knowledge of them except from the disputes of certain writers, who claimed his authority in support of their respective opinions or systems, we might then with reason weigh the comparative credibility of the respective parties, and thence infer, with a certain degree of probability, that the true interpretation lay with those authors who exhibited the greatest evidences of learning, industry, truthfulness and virtue. But in the case before us there is no need to have recourse to this line of arguing *a priori*; the works of St. Augustine and the book of Jansenius are open to all; we can, therefore, judge for ourselves upon the value of Jansenius's interpretation, from the intrinsic evidence of the writings. To those who are familiar with the writings of St. Augustine, nothing can appear more ridiculous than this appeal to the characters of the Jansenists as a proof of the correctness of their interpretation.

But to meet the argument on its own ground.—Were Jansenius and his followers the only men of learning, genius, energy and piety, who made the works of St. Augustine the study of their lives? Have his writings been wholly unknown to all except the Jansenists? The writer of the Letter knows full well that there is no father of the Church whose writings have at all times been more deeply studied, more highly valued, more universally admired, or more warmly loved by learned men, and great writers, and heroic saints, and indeed by all whose writings have adorned and defended the Church. For every single Jansenist there are hundreds of orthodox writers in every period whose interpretations of St. Augustine's meaning are utterly and absolutely opposed to the heretical interpretations of that insidious traitor to the Church.

If it were true, as this writer represents, that the prevalent doctrine in St. Augustine's later writings upholds the irresistibility of grace, destroys man's free-will and moral responsibility, and makes God the author of man's eternal damnation, it is a thing far more than *incredible* that the thousands and tens of thousands of learned men, of men full of the spirit of God, and of zeal for the truth, who lived during the long period of

above twelve hundred years, should have been too blind and too stupid to be able to discover it. Again, in estimating the comparative evidence in support of the respective credibility of interpreters, it should be a matter of no light weight to a Catholic to consider that one party uses the writings of an approved father and canonized Saint for the edification of the Church, while the other uses them for its destruction. A true Catholic would not lightly give his verdict in favour of heretical interpretations of that which the Church has approved, in preference to the interpretations of orthodox divines.

But what becomes of the argument if the Jansenists do not deserve the distinguished praise awarded to them by this historian? Whatever weight as a historian the writer of the Letter may be thought to possess, the picture of the Jansenists is nevertheless drawn in very different colours by other Catholic historians and by every Catholic divine. In illustration of this, I will refer to a few facts taken partly from the letters of Jansenius, and partly from the history of the Church, written by a modern author, whose European reputation both as a divine and a historian is certainly not second to that of the author of the Letter. See *Histoire Universelle de l'Eglise Catholique*, par l'Abbé Rohrbacher, Liv. lxxxvii. § 5.

When Baius was condemned by Pope Pius V. in 1567, he retracted his errors. But his disciple Jac. Janson, and Du Vergier de Haurane, adopted them and taught them to Jansenius. Haurane, commonly styled the Abbé de Saint Cyran, was a wilful heretic, as is manifest from his declarations to St. Vincent of Paul. He was the bosom friend of Jansenius, who lived with him for some years at Bayonne. He there led Jansenius to study the writings of St. Augustine for a heretical purpose, and thus was begun what cost Jansenius a labour of twenty-two years—his book *Augustinus*,—the aim and object of which is to father their preconcerted heresy on the holy Doctor. His letters to Haurane, one hundred and thirty-one in number, which were seized when the latter was imprisoned by Card. Richelieu, show that Jansenius wilfully supported errors which he knew had been condemned by the Church. He writes to Haurane in one of these; (*No. 16, 5 de Mars. 1621*), “Je n'ose dire à personne du monde ce que je pense, (selon les principes de S. Augustin) d'une grande partie des opinions de ce temps, et particulièrement de celle de la grâce et prédestination; de peur qu'on ne me fasse le tour à Rome qu'on a fait à d'autres (i. e. *Baius*) devant que toute chose soit meure et à son temps.”

In another letter (*No. 17, 4 Nov. 1621*) speaking of himself under the disguise of the cipher *Sulpice*, he says: “Les affaires de Sul-



pice, dont il vous avoit parlé, s'avancent peu à peu. Il croit qu'il a trouvé certaines racines, d'où sortiront des arbres pour en bastir une maison sur une matiere de Pilmot, de laquelle il avoit presque desesperé, comme il vous avoit dit. Il en escrit tous les jours, et a bonne esperance que tout viendra à son point." *Pilmot* is a cipher for his book *Augustinus*. These words clearly show that he was labouring to work out a preconcerted system, that he was studying how to force the meaning of St. Augustine into agreement with it, that he had found something on which he hoped to be able to work with success, although he had before been reduced almost to despair. He next goes on to express his fears about the nature of that success; he says: "Toutefois il doute de force [*sic*] choses....Car s'il fait voir ces choses à Chimer, il sera descrié pour le plus extravagant resveur qu'on a veu de son temps; c'est pourquoy il s'arreste souvent." *Chimer* is another cipher and signifies their adversaries, the Catholic divines, and particularly the Jesuits. The following words from a letter written in Latin (*No. 23, 11 Feb. 1622*) are descriptive of any thing rather than of the feelings of a Saint studying with humility the writings of a Saint, and contemplating the effect which he expects will result from the publication of the fruits of his study: "Nec vero despondit animum Boëtius" (this is another cipher for Jansenius) "tum quod animadvertat negotii gravitatem, non levem intercurrentium difficultatum collationem postulare;...tum vero quod persentiscat totius vitæ suæ momenta in inquietudinem, ac discrimen vocari, propter reclamantium verbo, ac scripto multitudinem, quibus os obstruendum erit, simul ac prælium fuerit inchoatum." In his last letter to Haurane (*No. 131, 23 Mars 1635*) Jansenius writes; "Je voudrois estre deschargé un peu plus d'occupations, pour vaquer plus à loisir au procez commencé, il y a plusieurs années: mais diverses traverses me sont de fois à autre données....Je croy que ces divertissemens mesmes me sont donnez par une volonté particuliere de Dieu, qui sçait quand il sera temps de le produire. Car de croire qu'il sera facile de le faire passer aux Juges; cela peut difficilement tomber en mon esprit, quelques dispositions qu'il y puisse avoir de delà; sçachant les extravagances qu'il y a, et les oppositions des esprits, de ceux mesme qui en semblent le plus approcher." Here by the term *procez* he means the book *Augustinus*, and by the *Juges*, the Holy See.

Thus after having laboured for nineteen years upon the work, he again, in writing to his confidential friend—the original instigator of, and constant adviser through the work—repeats what he had frequently expressed in former letters, that he never could persuade himself that the book would escape the censure

of the Holy See, notwithstanding all their measures taken to avert it; and he reveals his apprehensions that even those who seemed to be gained over to their party, would eventually oppose the book. Yet of this man the writer of the Letter in the Rambler asserts that his good faith cannot be called in question!

But the whole series of these letters breathes nothing but the spirit of deliberate intrigue against the Faith of the Church. The two heresiarchs mutually remind each other of the necessity of proceeding with secrecy, circumspection and prudence; and, above all things, they exhort each other to be careful to secure the patronage of men of power and influence, and more especially of religious communities. By these means alone they hoped to be able to overwhelm the opposition of the divines and of the Holy See, whose favourable judgment Jansenius was persuaded could not be obtained for his writings. With what fatal success they acted upon these principles every one knows who has read the history of Jansenism. While Jansenius was in private constantly engaged in elaborating his system of heresy, he at the same time composed and published orthodox books containing doctrine wholly repugnant to the principles of his *Augustinus*! He that can induce himself to believe that, in doing this, Jansenius thought he was acting with the good faith of a true Catholic, "*must at least admit that the whole history of the human mind presents no other instance of a similar delusion.*" In his labour upon the *Augustinus* he persisted till death. It is true that a few days before his death he wrote to Pope Urban VIII., submitting his work that had just been completed, to the judgment of the Holy See. But such acts as these are nothing unusual among heretics before their condemnation, and as the letter was not forwarded to the Pope, its object remains in doubt. When actually on the point of death, Jansenius again, in his last will, repeated the like submission. Possibly this might have been a sincere act, as far as it went, and might have been stimulated by feelings of remorse; but it was a miserable compromise with the warnings of his conscience when it was his imperative duty to have thrown the book into the fire. But to destroy by one act the work of his life—the work that it had cost him twenty-two years of unremitting labour to accomplish—proved too great a sacrifice to be made even in that last extremity. The book was willed to his chaplain, Reginald Lameo, who was enjoined to have it printed, although Jansenius knew, that by the prohibition of Urban VIII., 1625, it could not be lawfully done without the license of the Roman Inquisitors—a license which he knew could never be obtained. And thus died Jansenius, whom the writer of the Letter has deemed worthy of so much praise.

The case of the other chiefs of this faction is even worse than that of their leader. In 1640, two years after the death of Jansenius, the *Augustinus* issued from the press. In 1642 it was condemned by Urban VIII., as having been printed in defiance of the papal prohibition, and as containing propositions already condemned. In 1653 it was again formally censured by the Bull of Innocent X., which condemned the *five propositions* as heretical. Now all the members of the faction commended in the above citation, obstinately refused to submit to the decision of the Holy See. They strove, it is true, by absurd distinctions to avoid being expelled from the external fold of the Church, but they still persisted in their heresy, and the insincerity of their hearts could not be concealed by any sophistry about *dogmatic facts* or *reverential silence*. Yet these are the men whose *piety* the writer extols at the same time that he accuses St. Augustine of teaching even the heresy of Calvin.

But why refer to the history of these abettors of heresy when the writer of the Letter has himself negatived his own testimony of their pretended merits, and thus furnished the refutation of the argument founded upon their supposed credibility as interpreters? For he will not maintain that men, who are guilty of wilfully holding and teaching doctrines condemned by the Church, can, at the same time, be men of good faith and solid virtue. Now he distinctly proves that the Jansenists were at all times conscious that their system had been condemned by the Church. He says, p. 367,—

“Now Baius was the master and precursor of Jansenius; and Baianism, which continued to maintain itself in the Belgian universities in spite of a nominal submission to the Bulls directed against it, was in reality nothing but Jansenism in its first stage. The Jansenists were at all times conscious that their cause must stand or fall according as the Baianist system was admitted or rejected.”

According to this, when the Baianist heresy was condemned, its advocates, by a most iniquitous duplicity, *nominally* submitted, but *really* persisted in holding the heresy. But “Baianism *was in reality nothing but Jansenism* in its first stage;” Jansenism was, therefore, condemned in the condemnation of Baianism; and of this the Jansenists are declared to have been fully aware; for they “were *at all times conscious* that their cause must stand or fall according as the Baianist system was admitted or rejected.” They knew, therefore, that their cause was identified with that of the Baianists; but this, they well knew, had been already condemned, consequently their conduct was exactly the same as that of the Baianists; they were guilty of the same iniquitous duplicity

of *nominally* submitting to the Church while they *really* knowingly and wilfully persisted in the heresy that the Church had condemned. When the defender of the Rambler's assertion, called Jansenius a *pious* Bishop, and extolled Arnould, Nicole, Tillemont, Hermant, Sacy, &c., as men *distinguished for their piety*, he must surely have forgotten what he had previously written in condemnation of their duplicity.

The writer of the Letter supports his defence of the Rambler's assertion by assigning a most singular reason as the cause for which the Church condemned Jansenism. His representation of the motive of their condemnation implies that even the Church admitted the correctness of the Jansenistic exposition of St. Augustine's doctrine, for he attributes their condemnation as heretics, to their adherence to his *fallible* teaching. He says :

"Jansenism was condemned and cast out of the Church because it clung blindly to the authority of a single man—holy, indeed, and singularly gifted, yet *liable to error* ; and because, despising all others in comparison with him, it tried to compel the whole Church to submit unconditionally to his single dictation."

In the Bull of Innocent X., we find no mention of this singular motive for the condemnation of Jansenism, nor do we discover any thing peculiar to distinguish its condemnation from that of any other heresy. The five propositions are condemned because they are *heretical*. The Bull says nothing of St. Augustine, but the Church continued, just as it ever had done, to revere him as a Saint and Doctor, and a defender of its faith. In the view of the writer of the Letter, the Church had condemned St. Augustine.

Having thus led us to believe that the Church admitted the correctness of the Jansenistic exposition of St. Augustine's doctrine, and that consequently St. Augustine's doctrine fell under the censure of the Church, he next proceeds to represent that the divines, who combatted the errors of Jansenius, abandoned St. Augustine's doctrines as untenable. He says :

"Hence nearly all the divines who have written on grace and election against the Jansenists, argue that the authority of St. Augustine alone is not supreme and conclusive on these points."

If the writer mean to say, as his words and argument distinctly imply, that these divines argued thus because they felt that St. Augustine's doctrine was not orthodox, it is a flagrant and unpardonable misrepresentation of the fact. It is true that the divines argued in this manner ; nor could they argue otherwise. For the Jansenists assumed as a principle that, *in all disputed*



questions upon grace, the authority of St. Augustine alone was decisive. Now who is so blind as not to see that the Jansenists, by upholding this principle, overthrew the very foundation of faith, by setting up their private judgment, through the medium of their interpretation of St. Augustine, in opposition to the authority of the Church? This was the reason why the divines argued that the authority of St. Augustine alone was not supreme and conclusive; and for the same reason Pope Alexander VIII., in 1690, condemned the following proposition, no. 30: "*Ubi quis invenerit doctrinam in Augustino clare fundatam, illam absolute potest tenere, et docere, non respiciendo ad ullam pontificis bullam.*" At the same time, however, that the divines and the Church repelled this destructive principle of private judgment which is the foundation of all heresy, they vindicated the complete orthodoxy of St. Augustine. In like manner, in arguing with Protestants, divines always insist that the authority of the holy Scriptures, apart from the interpretation of them by the Church, is not supreme and conclusive on questions of faith. Is it necessary to remind the writer of the Letter, that the Church alone is the supreme judge in all controverted points of doctrine—that no written document can be set up as a *supreme and conclusive* authority in matters of faith—that not only the writings of St. Augustine, but the holy Scriptures, the Councils, papal Constitutions, the Fathers, and every other deposit of doctrine, are all alike subject to the interpretation of the living voice of the Church whose organ of speech is the Sovereign Pontiff? It is painful to be thus compelled, by this flagrant misrepresentation of the object and meaning of those Divines, to recall this elementary Catholic doctrine to the mind of the writer.

As a further confirmation of the justice of the claim to the title of disciples of St. Augustine, he represents the divines, in their embarrassment how to answer the Jansenists, as either evading the question, or else as being little successful when they undertake a direct reply to the passages quoted against them from that father. He says:

"They commonly appeal to the famous words of Pope Celestine: '*Profundiores vero, difficilioresque partes incurrentium questionum, quas latius pertractarunt qui hæreticis restiterunt, sicut non audemus contemnere, ita non necesse habemus adstruere, &c.*' and this even when, on particular points, they afterwards seek to weaken the effect of certain passages quoted against them by interpretations which are sometimes extremely far-fetched."

But what are the questions in reference to which the divines cite the above passage from Pope Celestine? Are they such as

concern the doctrine of irresistible grace or the other heresies of the sect? The holy Pope himself did not intend his words to apply to St. Augustine as teaching any such heretical doctrines; he holds him perfectly irreproachable on all matters of faith; for in the earlier part of the very same letter from which the above is quoted, he gives an unqualified approbation to his writings. He writes thus: *Epist. ad Episcopos. Gall. n. iii.*

“Augustinum sanctæ recordationis virum pro vita sua atque meritis in nostra communione semper habuimus, nec unquam hunc sinistrae suspicionis saltem rumor aspersit: quem tantæ scientiæ olim fuisse meminimus, ut inter magistros optimos etiam ante a meis semper decessoribus haberetur. Bene ergo de eo omnes in communi senserunt, utpote qui ubique cunctis et amori fuerit et honori.”

This letter of the Pope was written against the Semipelagians. Now the Semipelagians, in justification of their own heresy, maintained that St. Augustine's doctrine led to the very errors which the Jansenists afterwards pretended to draw from it. Therefore, when Pope Celestine, writing against men who imputed those errors to St. Augustine, gives an unqualified approbation of his orthodoxy, he clearly justifies St. Augustine from the charge of teaching the errors which were afterwards broached by Jansenius. Had the writer of the Letter considered this, he would have been more cautious than to make the use he has done of the words of Pope Celestine. *Incidit in foveam quam fecit.*

The tendency of the line of defence thus far adopted by the Rambler's advocate, calls for special consideration. We have seen that, in his opinion, St. Augustine taught the actual heresies of Jansenius; that the Church, by condemning the Jansenists for adhering to what he represents as the fallible teaching of St. Augustine, virtually admitted that St. Augustine taught the heresy which she was condemning, and that consequently she condemned St. Augustine. By these admissions he has conceded to the Jansenists, and formally maintained that which constitutes the very strength and danger of their system. For St. Augustine was the Jansenistic RULE OF FAITH. In the very same sense in which private interpretation of the Scripture is the Rule of Faith of Protestantism, so private interpretation of the writings of St. Augustine was the Rule of Faith of Jansenism. When the Church had condemned their heresy, the Jansenists cried out, the *Church has condemned St. Augustine*, and under the pretext of adhering to St. Augustine, they continued to resist her authority. In the same way does Protestantism continue in its obstinacy, and exclaim: *the Church has condemned*

*the Bible.* There is in this Protestant cry, the Church has condemned the Bible, a fatal power both to delude and corrupt. It is an appeal to the passions; it flatters the pride of the intellect, urging it to constitute itself judge of the authority of the Church, and to examine the claims of that authority by the testimony of the Bible—a testimony which the Church alone has made known to be the Word of God. When there is not a spirit of submission grounded on humility of heart, this is a dangerous temptation; and so fatal is it that the first act of consent to examine the rights of the Church by the Bible, is a formal fall from the faith. There was the like fatal power in the Jansenistic cry, *the Church has condemned St. Augustine.* For the Jansenists knew well that the Church, which gives us the Bible, had also borne ample testimony to the orthodoxy of St. Augustine; they knew that the doctrine of St. Augustine was her doctrine, and that, therefore, she could not drive them from their position by condemning the doctrine of the father. Thus the power of this delusive cry is wholly derived from the orthodoxy of St. Augustine, as the power of the Protestant cry depends on the Bible being the Word of God. Against these rebellious pretensions, what has the Church to oppose? She has no resource left but to assert her own divine authority. But this is the very point which, in their rebellion, they have begun to dispute. Protestants call in question her authority, and appeal to the reason of men, inviting them to examine if the Church has not erred by condemning the Bible; and in like manner the Jansenists called upon men to judge for themselves, and to see by the light of *their* interpretation of St. Augustine, if the Church had not erred by condemning that orthodox father. This appeal to human reason to test the decisions of the Church by the teaching of the learned and profound St. Augustine, was both a flattering and dangerous temptation to many great minds, if those can be called such in which there is found much self-confidence and presumption, and little or no submission to lawful authority. And, as the history of Jansenism informs us, the temptation proved fatal to many. Why then revive it now, as if in our own days, there were none to whom the temptation could prove dangerous? For the assertion that St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism, necessarily evokes the Jansenistic cry, *the Church has condemned St. Augustine,* and consequently offers a temptation to such as have not yet become little children in faith, to listen to the voice of private judgment, and to call in question the decisions of the Church.

Such is evidently the tendency of the Rambler's assertion, but the line of defence adopted in the Letter to justify that assertion,

has this tendency in a ten-fold degree. Had the assertion been well founded, still the danger consequent on broaching it, ought to have deterred any prudent Catholic from bringing it into notice. But it is not well founded—it is a groundless calumny against a Saint and Doctor of the Church. The writings of St. Augustine did not give birth to Jansenism any more than the Sacred Scriptures gave birth to Protestantism. Proud human reason exalting itself above the Wisdom and Veracity of God, is alike the source of both heresies. St. Augustine was, in no sense, the father of Jansenism. It was a wilful heresy conceived through that criminal love which prefers error to truth, begot by pride, brought forth in hypocrisy, and nurtured by rebellious duplicity. After its birth, its parents, it is true, stole some detached shreds from the teaching of St. Augustine, patched them together and strove to make a decent covering under the guise of which it might be passed off as a son of a noble father, and a legitimate child of the Church. Thus it was fraudulently fathered on St. Augustine, and many, who were willing to be deceived, paid homage to the imposture. But it bore not the features of either its pretended father or mother. The Church knows her own children, and no sooner did she set her eyes on this monster than she cast it from her as the spurious offspring of her enemy, and forbade her children to hold any communion with it. This is the true “paternity of Jansenism.”

All the incidental arguments of the Letter have now been answered: the chief and formally professed argument, which comprises upwards of three-fourths of the Letter, yet remains. The point attempted to be proved by means of this—the *Thesis* in fact of the whole Letter,—is stated thus:

“Jansenius and his school were not altogether in the wrong when they proudly called themselves the disciples of St. Augustine, and when they wrote voluminous works to prove the conformity of their theology with that of the Bishop of Hippo.”

He would have stated his proposition with more theological accuracy if he had called Jansenism a *heresy*, instead of applying to it the very considerate and respectable appellation of a *school of theology*; and his proposition would have indicated more correctly the tendency of his arguments, and would have been more in harmony with his conclusions, had he stated at the outset, that the Jansenists were altogether in the right, instead of saying that they were not altogether in the wrong. But allowing that to pass, how does he proceed? He first mentions the



method of proof which he does not mean to follow, and then describes that which he intends to adopt.

“This,” he says, “is not the place to enter fully and with the requisite distinctions into the merits of the controversy.”

It is generally thought, when a person enlists in a controversy, and undertakes to support one side of it, that to enter into its merits is of all things the most desirable, if not necessary. The natural and only conclusive mode of treating the question in accordance with the real *merits of the controversy*, would have been to have extracted from St. Augustine’s writings the passages which are said to contain the Jansenistic heresies—to have shown that those passages admit of no interpretation in conformity with St. Augustine’s teaching in other places, or with the doctrines of the Church, and that neither the divines nor the Church can vindicate their orthodoxy—and to have refuted the attempts that have been made to do so. Had he even endeavoured to do this, the soundness of the method would at least have met with the approbation of the common sense of all. But on the plea that “this is not the place,” he has declined to adopt the only method capable of leading to a satisfactory conclusion. He saw, no doubt, that such a method would lead to his own discomfiture; for he could say nothing that has not been already said and refuted; nor would the aid of “the requisite distinctions” have been of much avail if he had employed them with no more skill than he has evinced in his use of the distinction between infallible and irresistible grace. He adopts, therefore, a different method, which seems from the introductory part of the Letter, to have been suggested by the Editor of the Rambler. The Letter begins thus:

“You tell me that an expression incidentally used in the *Rambler*, to the effect that St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism, has given deep offence to many of your readers, and that many intimations of dissent and censure have reached you in consequence. You are anxious to have my opinion on the matter, and desire in particular that I should adduce from theological literature and ecclesiastical history, evidence of the light in which the Church has understood the position of St. Augustine towards Jansenius and his system. I shall endeavour to answer your wishes, as well as shortness of time and numerous occupations will permit. What I have to say will, I doubt not, be satisfactory to yourself: whether it will content the readers of the *Rambler*, and reconcile them to the expression which you used, remains to be seen.”

Had he confined himself to the strict sense of the Editor’s application, and dealt honestly with it, he could have satisfied all

its requirements in a few words, as thus:—History and theology alike afford evidence that the Church has ever regarded St. Augustine as one of her most eminent fathers, and doctors, and defenders of her faith; that she has ever held his writings in the highest esteem, as faithfully expounding her doctrines on grace; that she has honoured them with as high ecclesiastical approbation as she has ever honoured the writings of any other father; that she has visited no part of them with censure; but that, at the same time, she has never allowed them to become a rule of faith to any of her children; that she subjects the interpretation of them to the one unerring tribunal which can alone pronounce upon the orthodoxy of writings; for that she alone is sovereign, both as the teacher of faith and the judge of controversies, and hence that she regards the relation of Jansenius to St. Augustine to be the same as that of Jansenius to any other father, viz., one of direct opposition; that she has approved of the writings of St. Augustine, and condemned those of Jansenius as heretical.

If such had been the substance of his reply to the request of the Editor of the Rambler, it would have been both ample and in accordance with the teaching and spirit of holy Church; but he preferred a different course. He entered as heartily into the cause of the Rambler, and with as much zeal, as if he himself had given rise to the controversy, and he defended an assertion which prudence according to God, would lead its author to retract, while the prudence of man would have forbidden any one to speak in its defence. But instead of observing a judicious silence, which would have allowed this scandalous assertion to be soon forgotten, he boldly applies his theological and historical powers to the task of its justification, and the stores of theological literature and ecclesiastical history are searched for whatever can be found calculated to cast discredit on the doctrine of St. Augustine. With what success he has accomplished this part of his task is the question that comes next under examination. The formal argument put forth as the vindication of the assertion is stated thus :

“It will be enough to examine, concerning the doctrine of St. Augustine, the opinions of the most eminent among the older divines,—of men whose judgment has ever been of peculiar weight in the Church. We shall find in the whole Church, from the sixteenth century downwards, a perpetual protest against Augustine’s later theory of predestination, and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will, sometimes loudly and distinctly uttered, sometimes with more forbearance and reserve, according to the position and character of individual writers.”

In proof of the existence of such a "protest," reference is made to the following twenty-one authorities; Sadolet, Cajetan, Valerius, Genebrard, Claude de Xaintes, Mussus, Catharinus, Sixtus of Sienna, Osorio, Maldonatus, St. Francis of Sales, Norisius, Vasquez, Bossuet, Petavius, Serry, Annat, Dechamps, Adam, Sfondrati, and Languet, and citations are given in due form from their writings, as exhibiting the terms in which these writers respectively convey that protest.

Whoever is not previously acquainted with the estimation in which St. Augustine has ever been held by the Church and her divines, would naturally conclude from this bold and positive statement of the writer of the Letter, that it is a fact universally admitted by divines since the sixteenth century, that St. Augustine taught a doctrine on predestination which involves the consequences that grace is irresistible and that man has no free-will. "We shall find," the writer says, "in the whole Church, from the sixteenth century downwards, a perpetual protest against Augustine's later theory of predestination, and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will," and this protest is represented as being made "through the whole Church by the most eminent among the older divines—by men whose judgment has ever been of peculiar weight in the Church." Now this representation is utterly and entirely unfounded. We find no Catholic divines whatever who "protest against Augustine's later theory of predestination and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will." Had there been any, they surely could not have escaped the observation of one who is said to enjoy "a European reputation both as a theologian and as a historian," and who professedly undertakes to "adduce from theological literature and ecclesiastical history" evidence to establish this very proposition, and that too in order to silence men of learning and authority who, feeling greatly offended at finding St. Augustine called the father of Jansenism, have signified their dissent in unmistakeable terms of censure. Yet, although he has referred to no less than twenty-one authorities, and given ample citations from the writings of most of them, he has not been able to find even one who supports the assertion which he puts forth with so much ostentation.

But this is not the only point in which his argument utterly fails. What can be more unsound than to set up the opinions of divines as a tribunal competent to condemn the doctrine of St. Augustine in opposition to the approval of the Church? What can be more ridiculous than to select a few divines of a particular school and period, and in opposition to all others, to give them an exclusive authority to decide on the orthodoxy of an author's

writings? What, in fine, can be more untrue than to represent the handful of writers whom he has cited, as being the most eminent divines who adorned the Church during the sixteenth and following centuries? But allowing these gratuitous assumptions to pass, we will consider what evidence the authorities, on whom he has placed the issue of the controversy, have to offer in support of his pretentious statement.

In discussing the merits of the testimonies adduced by the writer of the Letter, I do not deem it necessary to follow the order of his citations. I will begin with those whose evidence, if it bore out his assertion, would be of the greatest importance. On the catalogue of his protesting witnesses he has unquestionably registered some great names. Petavius and Vasquez are giants in theology, St. Francis of Sales and Bossuet are truly great in their respective spheres, and the Cardinals Sfondrati and Norisius, and also Maldonatus, have justly acquired a high celebrity. But if these had "protested against Augustine's later theory of predestination and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will," that alone would have prevented them from ever attaining the eminence that their writings have secured to them.

To begin with Petavius, who is beyond comparison the greatest theologian named amongst the witnesses, and whose evidence is presented with every circumstance calculated to call attention to its supposed importance. The reader will hardly be prepared to expect that Petavius should be represented as accusing St. Augustine of the very charge against which he is actually vindicating him. The writer of the Letter cites him thus, p. 371:—

"If I am required to cite other eminent theologians who expressly or implicitly admit that the Jansenist doctrines are at least partially borrowed from the later writings of St. Augustine, I would quote the Jesuits Petavius, Adam, Dechamps, Cardinal Sfondrati, and Languet, Archbishop of Sens. I would point out especially the tenth book of the *Dogmata Theologica* of Petavius, and in particular the passage, cap. v. no. 1, on the *dura et immitis sententia*, with the admission of the Dominican Serry that the great theologian endeavours throughout this book to demonstrate 'Augustinum apostoli (Pauli) mentem minus feliciter attigisse atque ab ea toto cœlo aberrasse.' Consider also what he says in an earlier work: 'Non enim pauca neque contemnenda sunt Augustini dogmata, quæ vel ecclesiæ universæ vel theologorum aut omnium aut multorum nec infimi subsellii judicio reprobantur.' *De Trid. Con. Interp. et S. Aug. Doctrina.*"

Here the writer of the Letter calls especial attention to the fifth chapter of the tenth Book of the Dogm. Theol. of Petavius



as distinctly “admitting that the Jansenist doctrines are at least partially borrowed from the later writings of St. Augustine,” and in order to establish this he makes the learned theologian characterise some doctrine of St. Augustine as a *dura et immitis sententia*. Were this true, it would not prove that Petavius “admitted that the Jansenist doctrines were at least partially borrowed from the later writings of St. Augustine.” But Petavius does not characterise any doctrine of St. Augustine by the words *rigidæ immitisque sententiæ*, quoted by the writer as the *dura et immitis sententia*.

The reader will remember what has been already pointed out in reference to a citation from Bossuet, in which the writer asserts positively that he “rejects one of St. Augustine’s chief doctrines,” although, in the very same chapter, Bossuet declares that he has no intention of attributing the doctrine he was refuting to St. Augustine. It was then observed that there would be more occasions to point out examples of the singular practice, adopted by the writer, of making his authorities speak his own convictions. Here, then, is an example, but one of a much more flagrant character than the former; for whereas Bossuet simply disclaims all intention of discussing the doctrine of St. Augustine, Petavius in the place referred to, actually vindicates St. Augustine against those who maintained that the doctrine which he censures as the *rigida et immitis sententia*, was taught by the Saint; and he asserts that not one of the passages quoted by them from his writings bears the meaning which they assign to them, viz., that *Christ did not die for the reprobate*. This is the doctrine which Petavius calls a *rigida immitisque sententia*; it was, therefore, the doctrine of Calvin. I give at length the passage from Petavius; it is the beginning of chap. v.

“Unum præterea *rigidæ illius immitisque sententiæ* defensores nonnulli tuentur, quod neque veteribus probatum est Patribus (*of whom St. Augustine was one*) neque laudare nos possumus, Christum pro reprobis, id est pro longe maxima parte mortalium, non esse passum, suumve profudisse sanguinem, sed neque pro illis orasse. Quam opinionem non solum consentaneam esse Augustini dogmati de absoluta prædestinatione putant, sed etiam diserte ab illo traditam aliquot in locis, *quorum tamen nullus est*, qui perspicue reprobos excludat a communione meritorum illius; cum hoc tantum præferat, pro electis passum esse Christum, quod nemo eo sensu diffitebitur, ut pro illis absolute, vel cum fructu, et eo quem volebat effectum, mortem pertulerit.”

Petavius does not here tell us whose doctrine he is refuting, intending the refutation to apply to all, whether Calvinists or Jansenists, who, in any manner, held the doctrine that Christ

did not die for the reprobate. But so far is he from applying the words *rigidæ illius immitisque sententiæ* to this doctrine, as being that of St. Augustine, that he not only affirms that none of the passages cited by its defenders, bear that signification, but he proceeds to explain their meaning, showing that, when St. Augustine says that Christ died for the elect, he speaks of his absolute or efficacious will. This he unfolds more fully in the same chapter, no. II., in these words: “Sed omnia illa loca non id absolute significant, pro solis prædestinatis mortuum esse Christum, nisi eatenus, quod solis illis profuerit; quod Theologi in scholis exponunt sic; *sufficienter* pro omnibus passum esse, sed pro solis electis *efficaciter*.”

The writer of the Letter cannot have read the words which he cites, for, if he had, he must have formed a deliberate design to impose on the ignorance and credulity of his readers, by representing a great defender of St. Augustine's doctrine, as being so far opposed to it, as to charge it with containing the heresies of Jansenius. That he has not read this book of Petavius is confirmed by his reference to the Dominican Serry, and by his attempt to support his representation of Petavius by Serry's admission that the great theologian endeavours, throughout this book, to demonstrate that St. Augustine had not understood the meaning of St. Paul. For had he read the book, he would have formed his own judgment of it rather than have committed himself to a statement made against Petavius by an intemperate partisan of an opposite school; he would have seen in chap. IV. no. vii., that Petavius, so far from proving that St. Augustine did not understand St. Paul, vindicates him against the great objection that is brought against his interpretation of the words of the Apostle, *qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri*, I. Tim. ii. 4. He there shows that St. Augustine understood those words in the sense usually given to them, viz., the sense which Petavius has expressed in the citation above given—*sufficienter pro omnibus*.

But it is surprising that the writer should appeal to Serry as an authority. His *admission*, or rather his attack on Petavius, is not only utterly false, but it is irrelevant and worthless. That it is *false* the writer would have seen had he read the book referred to. That it is *irrelevant* is manifest; for if Petavius had endeavoured to demonstrate that St. Augustine had mistaken the meaning of St. Paul, it would not thence follow that he “admitted that the Jansenist doctrines were at least partially borrowed from the later writings of St. Augustine.” That it is *worthless* is proved from the *Index Librorum prohibitorum*, in which we read: “Serry (Jacobus Hyacinthus) *Historicæ, Criticæ,*

*Polemicæ de Christo ejusque Virgine Matre* (Decr. 11, Martii 1722)." Also, "*De Romano Pontifice in ferendo de Fide moribusque judicio, falli et fallere nescio.* (Decr. 11, Jan. 1733.)" The latter work was censured chiefly for the intemperate and injurious language in which he speaks of some of the best writers of the Church, although he attacked none so holy, so eminent, or so highly approved as St. Augustine, nor charged them with anything so condemnatory as the imputation contained in the assertion that "St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism." Serry, in fact, wrote a vindication of St. Augustine against the calumnious aspersions of that most irreverent writer Launoy; but with a humour and sarcasm peculiar to himself, he contended that Launoy had taken all that he had said against St. Augustine from certain Jesuit writers, of whom he mentioned twenty, including Petavius. We can, therefore, understand the spirit and purpose of Serry in making the *admission* quoted by the writer of the Letter.

The second citation from Petavius does not improve the writer's position. In the words, "*Non enim pauca,*" &c., Petavius merely affirms that there are to be found in St. Augustine not a few tenets that are universally rejected. But unless it be shown that the tenets referred to are the heretical doctrines of Jansenius, this statement no more proves that the Jansenist doctrines were borrowed from St. Augustine, than it proves that the doctrines of the Sacramentarians or Socinians were borrowed from him. But Petavius by the rejected tenets did not mean the doctrines of Jansenius. For he himself illustrates the bearing of his statement by one, and only one, example, in which he attributes to St. Augustine an erroneous opinion on the necessity of giving the holy Eucharist to infants—an opinion which has no connection whatever with Jansenism. But Petavius has not been happy in selecting this illustration; for he is not only opposed by grave authorities who entirely free St. Augustine from the imputation of holding that doctrine, (*See Norisius Vindiciæ Augustinianæ. Cap. iv. Par. iv.*) but he is opposed also by the Council of Trent. The Council, speaking of the ancient practice of giving the holy Eucharist to infants, expressly says that the fathers did not teach that this was done because they held the receiving of that sacrament by infants to be necessary for their salvation. These are the words of the Council. "*Ut enim sanctissimi illi patres sui facti probabilem causam pro illius temporis ratione habuerunt; ita certe, eos nulla salutis necessitate id fecisse, sine controversia credendum est.*" *Sess. xxi. cap. iv.* Again, Popes Innocent I. and Gelasius use the same language as St. Augustine. When, therefore, Petavius imputed that opinion to St. Augustine

he virtually imputed the same to Pope Innocent I. and Gelasius, and this in direct opposition to the Council of Trent.

But as regards the doctrines on grace, Petavius not only does not intimate that St. Augustine held any of the Jansenistic doctrines, but he vindicates his orthodoxy throughout, and has even devoted an entire book—*Lib. iv. De Opificio sex dierum*—to this special object. Consequently this citation from Petavius bears no relation to the question at issue. In the sense in which Petavius used those words, no lover of St. Augustine need hesitate to subscribe to them; they reflect no discredit on the profound doctor. For it would indeed be a strange thing if works, so voluminous as those of St. Augustine, contained no opinions from which we should feel inclined to dissent, considering especially that they were written centuries before many doctrines, since defined, were universally known to be matters of faith, and before theology had assumed a scientific form. In fine I would ask the writer of the Letter, if there be any divine even now, no matter what the degree of his authority, whose opinions he would be willing to follow in all things? There is no disparagement either of St. Augustine or theologians implied in this.

Petavius then does not “protest against Augustine’s later theory of predestination and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will;” and it is no light injury to that eminent theologian to impute to him so grievous a calumny against “the greatest doctor of the West.”

What is here said of Petavius applies equally to Vasquez, who next to Petavius, is certainly the most eminent divine amongst those whom the writer of the Letter has summoned to give evidence against the orthodoxy of St. Augustine. The testimony of Vasquez is adduced thus :

“Among the contemporaries of St. Francis we find the most subtle of the scholastic divines, the Jesuit Vasquez, repeatedly and expressly rejecting the doctrine of St. Augustine, especially his particularizing of grace.”

From this statement we should suppose that Vasquez was systematically opposed to St. Augustine’s doctrine, and especially to his doctrine on grace. It is natural then to expect from him some strong *protests* against St. Augustine’s Jansenism. He gives us the following quotations :

“Mihi in hac parte non probatur doctrina S. Augustini, sed existimo aliter philosophandum. *Comment. in 1 am. 2 dæ. disp. 193. cap. iv.* Compare what he says *disp. 132. cap. iii.* Ex ea enim opinione cogimur incidere in sententiam Pelagii.”

The doctrine which Vasquez says he does not approve, is, that some persons are left destitute of sufficient grace in consequence of their previous actual sins. But this is no part of the heresy of Jansenius, it is no heresy at all, it is only a speculative opinion. It is one thing to say in reference to a speculative opinion, that a different mode of *philosophising* ought to be adopted, and another thing to assert that St. Augustine taught the heresy of Jansenius. Because Vasquez says the former, the writer of the Letter adduces him to affirm the latter! Here is the third instance of his mode of forcing upon his authorities the convictions of his own mind.

He tells us to compare the above citation with what he says disp. 132. cap. iii. Having done so, I find no analogy whatever between the passages, but in addition to the words quoted, Vasquez has the following: “*Verum opinio Augustini, hoc modo intellecta, theologis scholasticis jam non probatur, ex ea enim opinione cogimur incidere in sententiam Pelagii.*” By omitting the words, *hoc modo intellecta*, the writer directly attributes the disapproved doctrine to St. Augustine, whereas Vasquez, by that qualifying clause, admits that the opinion in question may not have been that of St. Augustine. And most probably it was not. For assuredly it would have been a strange thing if St. Augustine’s doctrine favoured *Pelagianism*—the heresy which he had combatted with such zeal and success. But how incomparably strange it is to find a *divine* adducing an opinion rejected by Vasquez as leading to *Pelagianism*, as evidence that Vasquez attributed to St. Augustine the opposite heresy of *Jansenism*! The second citation is, therefore, not only unfairly quoted, but is in direct opposition to the statement which it is adduced to establish.

In his admiration of St. Augustine, and in his assiduity in studying his writings, Vasquez was surpassed by none of those whom the writer has deemed worthy of such extravagant eulogy. To represent him as being systematically opposed to St. Augustine’s doctrine on predestination and grace, is a gratuitous assumption made in defiance of the most manifest evidence to the contrary. Vasquez, with Suarez, was the founder of Congruism, and holds of course the opinion—“*Electionem efficacem ad gloriam factam fuisse ex meritis gratiæ prævisis.*” Now this opinion he professes to sustain on the authority of St. Augustine, and he explains in accordance with this theory, the passages quoted against it by the advocates of the opposite opinion.—See *Comm. in 1 am. disp. 89. cap. vi. vii. and viii.* Again, in *disp. 90. cap. iii.*, in refuting the erroneous opinions on predestination held by Catharinus, who is one of the authorities quoted against St.



Augustine in the Letter, he says: "Primo in eo plane deceptus est (*Catharinus*), quod putavit in Augustino prædestinationem ad gloriam esse voluntatem dandi illam, non præparationem donorum gratiæ.....Ibi (disp. 89, cap. viii.) tamen perspicue ostendi in Augustino prædestinationem non esse voluntatem dandi vitam æternam, sed esse præparationem donorum gratiæ, quibus aliqui consequuntur vitam æternam."

Such is Vasquez's view of St. Augustine's doctrine on predestination. So far is this theory from entailing as consequences the resistlessness of grace and the denial of free-will, that if it do err, it errs by granting too little to the efficacy of grace, and too much to the freedom of the will. Yet the writer of the Letter makes Vasquez "protest against Augustine's later theory of predestination and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will!" The reader will now begin to understand the reckless use which this writer makes of his authorities. He will see that if he find in ■ writer the slightest expression seeming to indicate dissent from any opinion of St. Augustine—no matter what the subject of that opinion may be—no matter whether the dissent make for his cause, or against it as in the case of Vasquez—that writer is immediately declared to protest against St. Augustine's teaching of Jansenism. It is even deemed a sufficient ground for quoting an author against St. Augustine, if he object to a doctrine which the *writer attributes to that father*, and that even though the author himself may disclaim all intention of refuting him, as in the case of Bossuet, or be actually refuting those who impute a Jansenistic doctrine to his teaching, as in the case of Petavius.

But the abuse of the authorities quoted against St. Augustine has not yet reached its climax. Even the gentle and amiable St. Francis of Sales is adduced as a protester against "Augustine's later theory of predestination, &c.," and two passages are cited in proof of this; yet in neither of them does the Saint object either to the doctrine of St. Augustine, or even to any of the errors attributed to him by the writer of the Letter. The first is from a letter written in Latin to Lessius in 1613, and contains no more than an expression of the Saint's approval of the school opinion that predestination is *post prævisa merita*, in preference to that which advocates predestination *ante prævisa merita*. Every student in theology is familiar with the questions still debated in the schools on these two opinions, and knows that he may adopt either the one or the other with perfect integrity of faith. Again, every one who has read even a *compendium* of Ecclesiastical history, knows that the famous Congregations *De*

*Auxiliis*, in which the merits of these opposite opinions were fully discussed, terminated in 1607 without any doctrinal decree, and that the Holy See allowed the several parties to hold and teach their respective opinions, while, at the same time, it forbade them to pass censures on each other. If, therefore, St. Francis, by approving of the theory of predestination *post prævisa merita*, thereby protested against the orthodoxy of the opposite theory, and of that of St. Augustine for teaching it, he acted in opposition to the then recent decree of the Holy See, which had forbidden that opinion to be thus censured. But who would be so irreverent as to attribute such conduct to St. Francis of Sales? He does not say that he rejects the adverse theory as being contrary to faith. When, therefore, the writer of the Letter quotes this from St. Francis as a protest against St. Augustine for teaching the heresy which Jansenius afterwards adopted, he is, as before, simply expressing his own convictions, and is really guilty of the conduct which he seems to impute to the Saint. The principles, however, on which he thus adduces the testimony of St. Francis, are capable of a much wider application; according to these, every Congruist is a protester against the Jansenism not only of St. Augustine, but of the entire schools of Thomists and Augustinians. With these observations I give at length the portion of the letter of St. Francis from which the writer has taken his extracts.

“Ac demum obiter vidi in bibliotheca Collegii Lugdunensis tractatum de Prædestinatione; et quamvis non nisi sparsim, ut fit, oculos in eum injicere contigerit, cognovi tamen, Paternitatem Vestram sententiam illam, antiquitate, suavitate, ac Scripturarum nativa auctoritate nobilissimam, *De Prædestinatione* ad gloriam post prævisa opera amplecti ac tueri; quod tam mihi gratissimum fuit, qui nimirum eam semper, ut Dei misericordiæ, ac gratiæ magis consentaneam, veriore ac amabiliorem existinavi; quod etiam tantisper in libello *De Amore Dei* indicavi.” (*See this letter in Feller's Dictionnaire Historique—Lessius*). The writer of the Letter cites the above in these terms:

“With these men” (*protesters against St. Augustine's doctrine*) “we need not hesitate to associate in the present question one of the greatest saints and most enlightened theologians of the last three centuries, St. Francis of Sales, Bishop of Geneva. Attentive readers of his beautiful, consoling, and edifying treatise *De l'Amour de Dieu* are aware of the theory to which he adheres respecting the relation of the divine decree to the salvation of man. In a letter to the eminent Jesuit divine Lessius he speaks distinctly on this head. He rejoices that Lessius had maintained that opinion, ‘so ancient, so consoling, and so fully authorized by the testimony of the Scriptures

taken in their natural sense, namely, that men are predestined to glory in consequence of their foreseen merits.' He is alluding to the singularly perspicuous and accurate work, *De gratia efficaci, Decretis divinis, Libertate arbitrii et Præscientia Dei conditionata*. Antwerp, 1610. 4to. It is properly a vindication by Lessius of his own teaching; for so early as 1587-88 the theologians of Louvain and Douay, mostly disciples of Baius, had condemned in thirty-four propositions, the system of Lessius and of his brother Jesuit Hamelius. Now Baius was the master and precursor of Jansenius; and Baianism, which continued to maintain itself in the Belgian Universities in spite of a nominal submission to Bulls directed against it, was in reality nothing but Jansenism in its first stage. The Jansenists were at all times conscious that their cause must stand or fall according as the Baianist system was admitted or rejected. This is why Jansenism afterwards made such fearful progress in the Netherlands, as may be seen by the account in Fénélon's correspondence. But I cannot refrain from quoting the very words of the saint, who goes on to say: 'Ce qui a esté pour moy le sujet d'une grande joye, ayant toujours regardé cette doctrine comme la plus conforme à la miséricorde de Dieu, et à sa grâce, comme la plus approchante de la vérité, et comme la plus propre à nous porter à aimer Dieu.' "

We are here favoured with an extraordinary specimen of logical deduction. I must leave to the reader the task of analysing the process by which the writer has here attempted to identify a mere approval of a school opinion with a protest against Jansenism as taught by St. Augustine. It certainly needs no refutation. But the writer seems not to have observed that if the opinion opposed to the one approved by St. Francis had been contrary to faith, the Saint would have paid Lessius a very questionable compliment in so warmly commending him for not adopting it. The writer next passes to the second testimony of St. Francis in these terms:

"Francis had other grounds besides these for abandoning the opinion of St. Augustine; for he too had convinced himself that the common teaching and tradition of the fathers of the first four centuries was opposed to it, and he has stated this in plain terms in one of his letters."

He adds in the notes:

"This remarkable passage is to be found in Serry, *Historia Congregationum de Auxiliis*, p. 762, ed. Venet., who quotes lib. i. ep. 61. 'In ea quæstione utrum prædestinatio sit ex prævisis meritis, seu antiqua Patrum qui Ambrosium præcessere sententia teneatur, seu Augustini aut Angelici Doctoris opinio probetur,' &c. Serry (*he continues in the text*) rebukes the Saint for this, which, he says,

is a false and dangerous opinion that has been rejected by the Schools.' ”

Now why does he quote this through the medium of the questionable testimony of Serry rather than directly from the letters of St. Francis? Is it because he seeks to throw the responsibility of misrepresenting the meaning of the Saint upon a writer who has already much to account for on a similar charge? Is it because “Serry rebukes the Saint for this,” as if St. Francis had expressed a decided opinion against St. Augustine’s doctrine? On referring to the letter of St. Francis, *ed. Paris, 1652, p. 899*, I find that the Saint is giving advice “A un Pere Fueillant” (or Feuillant) on the method of writing books, and that, telling him where he may employ his *affective* style, he says: “En celle *utrum prædestinatio sit ex prævisis meritis?* soit que l’on tienne l’opinion des Saints Peres, qui ont precedé Saint Ambroise, soit qu’on tienne celle de Saint Augustin, ou celle de Saint Thomas, ou celle des autres; on peut former les argumens en style affectif sans amplifier, ains en abbregeant: et au lieu de dire *secundum argumentum sit*, simplement mettre un chiffre.2.” He then passes to a different subject. Where can we find in this a protest against St. Augustine, or a proof that “Francis had other grounds for abandoning his opinion?” He simply alludes to different opinions as being all tenable, without stating what they are, or giving a preference to any one in particular. Whatever be the opinion attributed by St. Francis to St. Augustine, he at all events admits its orthodoxy; consequently it is a matter of perfect indifference whether or not St. Augustine agreed with the fathers who preceded St. Ambrose; the mere circumstance of his agreeing or disagreeing with them can prove nothing as to the correctness of the opinion itself, any more than it can determine the correctness of that of St. Thomas or of the others. Nothing, therefore, would be sacrificed by conceding to the writer of the Letter that, not only St. Francis, but also Norisius, Maldonatus, and the others quoted for the same object, are of opinion that St. Augustine differed on this immaterial point from the fathers who preceded him. Such a concession would not advance the writer’s cause, and these authors must consequently be so far erased from the list of his supposed protesters.

But Norisius is not of this opinion, and in adducing him, the writer of the Letter has wholly misrepresented his meaning. He cites Norisius thus. After observing that

“Bossuet...gives himself incredible pains to explain away the fact of the great difference between the primitive teaching of the Church and the specific doctrine of St. Augustine”...he adds: “We can oppose

to the weight of his name the authority of the most learned among the Augustinians, Cardinal Noris, which on this point is certainly not inferior to his own. In his work, *Anonymi Scrupuli evulsi et eradicati*, p. 71, he concedes to Petavius what the latter had incontestably proved, that the view of the Bishop of Hippo on predestination and grace was new. He moreover admits that Vincent of Lerins, in his *Commonitorium*, had chiefly Augustine and his doctrine of grace in view in his warnings against a deviation from the general tradition. But he defends him against the charge of being an innovator in matters of dogma, on the ground that he had started a new opinion only in a matter which had not yet been decided by the Church." *He quotes in the notes*, "Novatores appellantur qui nova dogmata, orthodoxæ fidei antiquitus traditæ contraria comminiscuntur, non qui novam opinionem in quæstione nondum ab ecclesia definita proponunt."

Now Norisius does not "concede to Petavius that the view of the Bishop of Hippo on predestination and grace was new;" he says merely that Petavius *tries to prove this*. He does not "defend him against the charge of being an innovator in matters of dogma, on the ground that he had started a new opinion only in a matter which had not yet been decided by the Church:" but he states this as the ground on which *Petavius* held him justified from that charge. On the contrary, Norisius in this very place, meets the charge by referring to St. Augustine's answer to it; and in his *Vindiciæ Augustinianæ*, cap. v. par. vi., he professedly refutes it at length, and answers Claude de Xaintes, Catharinus, and Osorio who had preferred it against the Saint. The very passages, from these three authors, which Norisius has refuted, are all, as will be seen hereafter, again brought forward in the Letter, as if they never had been refuted; and when the author of that Letter said that Norisius "concedes to Petavius that the view of the Bishop of Hippo was new," he could hardly fail to be aware that Norisius had expressly refuted this charge, and that, too, as advanced by these very men; for in his citation from Catharinus he refers to the actual place.

The object of Norisius in the passage quoted by the writer is to expose the bad conduct of the Semipelagians by contrasting it with the upright conduct of Petavius. The Semipelagians, he says, accused St. Augustine's doctrine on predestination *ante prævisa merita*, of novelty (i.e. heresy) on the ground that the earlier fathers had taught differently. Now Petavius proves that St. Augustine held this doctrine, and he also *tries to prove* that the earlier fathers held the contrary opinion. But can it be said of Petavius that he, therefore, made St. Augustine an innovator? No, for an innovator is one who broaches new doctrines contrary to faith, not one who starts merely new opinions that do not affect



faith. These words are not a defence by Norisius, as himself admitting the novelty of the view of the Bishop of Hippo, but as made according to the mind of Petavius. That this is the meaning intended by Norisius will be seen by an attentive perusal of the whole passage which is as follows.

“ Vincentius, Cassianus alique sententiam S. Augustini de prædestinatione ante prævisa merita novitatis inculpabant, quod secus anteriores Patres docuerant; ex illa enim necessitatem fatalem aliaque absurda inferri contendebant. Dionysius Petavius, tom. i. dogm. Theolog. lib. 9. cap. 6. egregiè probat S. Augustinum statuisse, Deum ante prævisionem meritorum prædestinasse electos ad gloriam. Idem verò toto capite tertio contendit ostendere, Sanctos Patres Augustino anteriores in contraria sententia communi consensu fuisse. Ergone dicetur Petavius *S. Augustinum ex defensore antiquæ fidei novatorem, ex Catholico hæreticum fecisse?* Novatores appellantur, qui nova dogmata Orthodoxæ fidei antiquitus traditæ contraria comminiscuntur; non qui novam opinionem in quæstione nondum ab Ecclesia definita, proponunt. At etenim constat Massilienses laudatæ Augustini sententiæ novitatem objecisse... Quibus respondet S. Doctor, cap. 14. *de prædest. Sanct.* et cap. 19. *de dono perseverantiæ*, ubi Sanctorum Cypriani et Ambrosii auctoritate suam de prædestinatione sententiam confirmat.” The following is the passage here referred to in S. Augustine, *De prædest. Sanct.* cap. 14. “ Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista hæresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quæstione versari? quod procul dubio facerent si respondere talibus cogerentur. Unde factum est de gratia Dei quid sentirent, breviter quibusdam scriptorum suorum locis et transeunter attingerent; immorentur vero in eis quæ adversus inimicos Ecclesiæ disputabant.” Hence, according to St. Augustine himself, he did not differ from the earlier fathers, but they, having no occasion to discuss these difficult questions, did not unfold the doctrines on grace as they certainly would have done had they had his enemies to refute. What, then, can be more remote from the intention of Norisius, who refers to this passage in justification of St. Augustine, than to concede to Petavius that there existed this difference between them? On this subject Suarez writes, *Proleg.* vi. cap. 6. no. 4. “ Unde duo dicenda sunt de Patribus Pelagio antiquioribus. Unum est, licet ex professo de gratia Dei non disputaverint, quia nondum in Ecclesia controversia illa exorta erat, nihilominus nihil doctrinæ Augustini de gratia Dei contrarium docuisse.” Vasquez has the following: “ Alterum, in quo hi auctores, (namely Catharinus, Sixtus Senensis, Osorio, &c.) fuerunt decepti, est,

quod putarunt Græcos Patres Augustino contraria docuisse, quasi assereret Augustinus homines ad gloriam sine meritis electos fuisse." *Com. in Iam. Disp.* 89. cap. 8. Yet, speaking of the existence of this difference between St. Augustine's doctrine and that of the earlier fathers, the writer of the Letter says :

"But in this question, which must be determined on purely historical grounds, it matters not what the Thomists and Augustinians, in the traditional theology of their schools, have settled upon the point, or what they have laid down in their lectures. Among theologians of real historical and patristic learning the matter has never been doubtful."

Then, neither Bossuet nor Norisius, nor any of the Thomists or Augustinians, not even Vasquez and Suarez, the founders of Congruism, were theologians of real historical and patristic learning!

I do not deny that Norisius "*admits* that Vincent of Lerins in his *Commonitorium*, had Augustine and his doctrine of grace in view in his warnings against a deviation from the general tradition," if that can be called an *admission* which is really a *charge* against St. Vincent, and which Norisius has laboured earnestly to establish. Norisius adopts the opinion that the *Objectiões Vincentianæ* refuted by St. Prosper, were from the pen of St. Vincent of Lerins. He consequently maintains that St. Vincent was, though inculpably, a Semipelagian, and that, therefore, he opposed the doctrine of St. Augustine, who had written against that sect. Reading, then, the *Commonitorium* under this persuasion, he supposes that St. Augustine is attacked in certain passages which, however, others do not believe to have had any such object; for in the *Commonitorium* there is not a single *direct* reflection upon St. Augustine. If, therefore, Norisius be correct in his idea of St. Vincent, he has just reason to censure him for his *indirect* attacks upon St. Augustine; but if he be mistaken in that idea, he is equally mistaken in his supposition that in the *Commonitorium* St. Vincent alludes to St. Augustine. In neither case does his *admission* concede anything in favour of the writer's cause. It is, therefore, with little reason that "the authority of the most learned among the Augustinians, Cardinal Noris," has been thus "opposed to the weight of the name of Bossuet."

Maldonatus is thus quoted :

"The opinion of Osorio is also that of the best commentator of the sixteenth century, Maldonatus. He too reproaches the Augustinian doctrine with its novelty, and with being in contradiction with

the whole Greek Church; and he shows how forced is the construction which the saint puts upon certain passages of St. Paul, such as 1 Tim. ii. 4."

He supports this with the following quotations.

"*Nam sententia Augustini ante illum inaudita fuit, et post illum nullus Græcus author eam secutus est.*" (De prædestinatione, Maldonati Opera varia, Paris, 1677, ii. 107).

"*Quod, quidquid dicat Augustinus, non potest intelligi nisi de singulis hominibus (namely, that God wishes the salvation of all men). Interpretationes enim D. Augustini alienissimæ sunt a sensu D. Pauli.*" (ibid. 109.)"

Now how are these words to be interpreted as a "protest against Augustine's later theory of predestination and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will?" The futility of adducing the imputation of novelty as such a protest has been amply exposed. As regards the second passage, if Maldonatus says that St. Augustine has not correctly interpreted the text of St. Paul, "*Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri,*" 1 Tim. ii. 4, he does not therefore say that the interpretations given by him contain the heresies of Jansenius. In remarking on the testimony adduced from Petavius, it was observed that he proves (Dog. Theol. lib. x. cap. iv. no. vii.) that St. Augustine understands that text to include all men according to the ordinary interpretation; and (ib. cap. v.) that none of the interpretations given by him exclude the ordinary interpretation. The Jansenists argued from his giving other interpretations, that he denied that God willed the salvation of all. But in this they argued most illogically. Considering the object for which this quotation from Maldonatus is given in the Letter, it would seem that its writer would wish it to be inferred that Maldonatus adopts the same fallacious reasoning.

His abuse, however, of the words of Cardinal Sfondrati is still more flagrant. Of him he says:—

"In naming Cardinal Sfondrati in company with these Jesuits, I have in my eye what he says in his *Nodus prædestinationis dissolutus*, of the danger which the writings of Augustine present to those who adopt his doctrine of predestination."

He makes no extract but refers to Pars. i. § 1, no. 17. Referring to this place I find that the Cardinal speaks of those who do *not* adopt his doctrine on predestination, and who speculate on questions into which St. Augustine abstained from entering. These are his words. "*Sane quam difficilis intellectu sit Augustinus, quantoque periculo ab iis legatur, qui omissa causa, quam ille contra Pelagianos agebat, alia Prædestinationis arcana*"

quærent, quæ ille nescire potius voluit, quam quæri; nemo illustriori exemplo, ac malo suo, quam Cornelius Jansenius Episcopus Iprensis docuit. Is enim in suo Augustino, Libro procœmiali, cap. 10. et 18. testatur, se in omnibus Augustini Libris evolvendis supra viginti duos annos operam navasse, omnesque trices percurrisse. Quis non crederet, post tantum studium, tot annorum industriam nemini magis Augustini mentem potuisse compertam esse? Et tamen cum omissa causa, quam Augustinus ex professo agebat, alia rimatur, quæ non agebat Augustinus, in perniciosissimas hæreses, et ab Augustino alienissimas incidit, quas primo Theologi Christiani calamo damnarunt, ac demum Innocentius X. Pontifex Maximus anathemate percussit."

This needs no comment. I will simply observe that the writer of the Letter from the same premises, arrives at a conclusion the very opposite to that of the Cardinal. The former says: "Who (*Jansenius*) after studying for thirty years the writings of St. Augustine, &c. That such a man, whose good faith cannot be called in question, should have failed utterly in the labour of his whole life, and have entirely mistaken the doctrine of St. Augustine is hardly credible." Compare this with the words "in perniciosissimas hæreses et ab Augustino alienissimas," &c.

The writer's concluding witness is Languet; he says:

"Finally, I shall conclude this list of authorities with a quotation from a prelate who was the ornament of the French episcopate, the best divine among the bishops of his time, and who was honoured in Rome as the foremost adversary of the later Jansenists. In his *Première Instruction pastorale* of 1718, p. 95, against the appellants, Languet, then Bishop of Soissons, adopts the words of Dupin on St. Augustine (*Bibliothèque Ecclés.* iii. 387), 'qu'il s'est souvent éloigné des sentimens de ceux qui l'avoient précédé pour suivre une route toute nouvelle, soit dans les explications de l'écriture, soit dans les opinions des théologiens,' with the reservation afterwards added by Dupin himself in his *Retractation*: "C'est ce que je n'ai nullement entendu des dogmes de foi, mais de quelques opinions, qui ne sont regardées par les théologiens que comme de simples opinions." Languet concludes from this that we must seek to reconcile Augustine with the other fathers; but that this must be done, not according to our private opinion, but taking for our guide the decisions of the Church. This is intelligible enough."

Truly this is intelligible: but that any rational man should bring forward this as a protest against St. Augustine is a phenomenon most unintelligible; for unless the writer holds, as the Jansenists did, that absolute predestination, involving as consequences irresistible grace and the denial of free-will, is a doctrine in no way opposed to the faith of the Church, he could not have failed to

perceive that the evidence of Languet is a flat contradiction of the thesis which it is brought to establish.

After this citation from Languet the Letter concludes thus:—

“So much at least is evident from what I have said, that the writer of the passage on the paternity of Jansenism, if, as I doubt not, he understood it with the above restrictions, finds himself in very good, I may say, in most select company. I know no better in the Church.”

Now what does he mean by “*the above restrictions*?” Does he mean those just mentioned by Languet, which declare St. Augustine to be perfectly orthodox? If so, the Jansenists fraudulently fathered their own heresy on St. Augustine; and in that case he is in no true sense the father of that heresy. The writer has mentioned no other restrictions, but, as has been amply proved, he has again and again attributed to St. Augustine the very worst heresies both of Jansenius and Calvin.

He says that the writer of the passage, asserting that St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism, finds himself in very good—in most select—company, than which he knows none better in the Church. If this be true, the writers appealed to by him must all have asserted that St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism. But the examination now made of the very testimonies adduced by him from eight of the most eminent of his authorities, not to mention the worthless testimony of Serry, has proved this to be utterly untrue. Maldonatus says nothing about it; Vasquez, if his words had imputed anything, would have made him not the father of Jansenism but of Pelagianism; Bossuet actually disclaims it; St. Francis of Sales and Languet virtually declare the opposite; Sfondrati asserts the contrary in the most explicit terms; while Petavius and Norisius actually defend the contrary by argument both in the very passages quoted and in other parts of their writings.

The work so far accomplished in the writer’s task of “adducing from theological literature and ecclesiastical history evidence of the light in which the Church has understood the position of St. Augustine towards Jansenius and his system,” has, for anything I know to the contrary, been the product of his own stores of theological and historical learning. But there still remain twelve authorities not yet considered. The labour, however, of collecting nine of these has been executed by the other three; for it appears from Norisius, in his *Vindiciæ Augustinianæ*, that in this amiable work of collecting from writers expressions in any way disparaging to St. Augustine, the writer of the Letter has been preceded by Annat, Adam, and Dechamps. Norisius



answers these as well as the quotations adduced by them from other writers. Among these are found all the remaining authorities brought forward in the Letter, viz., Sadolet, Sixtus Senensis, Genebrard, Catharinus, Claude de Xaintes, Osorio, Cajetan, Mussus, and Valerius. In this portion of his labours in which others have prepared the matter to his hands, there is found—and we might expect as much after seeing the above exposure—greater fidelity in his quotations, but, as none of the writers quoted have proposed to themselves the task of proving his thesis, the *bearing* of the quotations contributes no more towards the furtherance of his object than those already considered.

In the citations which he has made from *great* writers, so much that seems to savour of bad faith has been already exposed, that the refutation of these *inferior* witnesses might be safely left in the hands of Norisius. He has introduced his name as possessing weight worthy to be put into the balance against that of Bossuet, and calls him “the most learned among the Augustinians.” This high commendation of his merits leaves no ground for him who gives it, to question such an authority. For it is difficult to reconcile this commendation with a conviction existing at the same time in the mind of the panegyrist, that Norisius had wholly failed in every instance to vindicate St. Augustine from the aspersions which he has again brought forward in his Letter. Yet if he have not this conviction—if he admit the success of Norisius’s vindication—we meet with a difficulty of still more formidable aspect: he must have repeated aspersions against St. Augustine, which he had seen refuted, *to his own satisfaction*, by Norisius; and this with as little regard to those refutations as if they had never existed. He must have done more than this; he must have exaggerated them grievously, for he cites them as charging St. Augustine with the heresies of Jansenius: yet not one of them was written to convey so grave a charge—not one of them is quoted by Annat, Adam, or Dechamps, as conveying it. Under these circumstances I should be justified in passing over the remaining authorities. But as the reader may wish to know what they are, for his satisfaction I will notice them briefly.

Annat is referred to solely as approving and confirming the testimony of Catharinus, which will be referred to hereafter.

Adam, it appears from Norisius and the citations in the Letter, has passed some very irreverent criticisms on St. Augustine’s style, and Norisius has answered him in upwards of thirty places; but, in the quotations now adduced, not a single word is found imputing to the Saint any error against faith.

The *writer* indeed says: "He confesses that if St. Augustine is accepted as arbiter his Jansenist adversary wins the day." But experience has created a diffidence in accepting his representations of the meaning of his authorities, particularly when not justified by the words of the authors; and in proof of this confession he only quotes the following: "Ces opinions de Calvin sont exprimées en quelques endroits des livres de S. Augustin, *si vous suivez le dehors des termes*." This means no more than that the opinions of the Jansenists are to be found in some places of St. Augustine, if you do not interpret them according to his real meaning!

He quotes Dechamps thus:

"Etienne Dechamps, rector of the Jesuit College in Paris, and one of the best divines of the order, has devoted a volume of 336 pages in folio to prove Jansenius *S. Augustini Patrumque corruptor*. But in 1664, long after the appearance of that work, he writes to the Prince de Conti: 'Le grand principe de Calvin est que par le péché d'Adam la liberté est devenue une nécessité,—*ex libertate facta est necessitas*,—et par conséquent que nous n'avons plus la liberté qui exclut la nécessité. Or il est évident qu'on trouve dans tous les ouvrages de S. Augustin contre les Pélagiens un grand nombre de passages qui semblent exprès et formels pour ce principe de Calvin.' Like Adam, he speaks of Calvin, but means Jansenius."

As in the quotation from Adam the writer disregarded the clause, *si vous suivez le dehors des termes*, which wholly negatives the meaning which the previous words would otherwise convey, so in this from Dechamps he disregards the word *semblent*, which represents that those passages of St. Augustine contain the Jansenistic principle *in appearance only*; for the writer adduces these words to prove that St. Augustine *really* taught that principle! Again he seems to think nothing of setting aside the published work of Dechamps—Jansenius *S. Augustini Patrumque corruptor*—and of considering it as retracted after a lapse of years, by this passage in a private letter, interpreted in his peculiar way. I may further remark that these words of Dechamps's letter, taken as he has understood them, are in contradiction with his own favourite theory, that the *earlier* writings of St. Augustine against the Pelagians taught the doctrine of the Church, and that the Jansenistic doctrines are found in his *later* writings; for Dechamps makes no such distinction, but speaks of all the writings against the Pelagians indiscriminately: "Or il est évident qu'on trouve dans *tous* les ouvrages de S. Augustin contre les Pélagiens," &c.

There is nothing, then, in these three writers to support the

Rambler's cause. We come now to the authorities quoted by them and refuted by Norisius.

Cardinal Sadolet heads the long list of twenty-one witnesses, and he justly deserves this prominent position, for of all the authorities cited, his testimony approaches nearest to the mind of this new antagonist of St. Augustine. A witness of such importance requires a good character; accordingly, he is introduced with no small degree of ostentation.

"I will begin with one whose name shines like a star of the first magnitude among those who, in the sixteenth century laboured to reform and restore the Church, Cardinal Sadolet, Bishop of Carpentras."

Having taken some pains to discover from ecclesiastical writers their estimate of the magnitude of this star, I find that it is described as shining with great lustre in the constellation of literature, but that in that of theology it is merely telescopic. He proceeds:

"To him it appeared intolerable that Augustine, herein forsaking the doctrine of all the Greek and Latin fathers before him, should have asserted the theory of absolute election, according to which God bestows His grace on a few only, and abandons the rest of mankind to misery and perdition. Ex altera parte, etsi ab ea stet doctor maximus idemque gravissimus et sanctissimus vir (Augustinus), tamen durum admodum mihi videtur, quodque illabi non facile queat in sensus nostros, si omnino a nobis nihil sit, quod valeat ad obtinendam gratiam, &c." (*Com. in Ep. ad Rom. lib. ii.*)

Compare these words of Sadolet with the above version of them, and it will be found a rare specimen of a free translation. Norisius reproaches Annat, who quotes the above, with detracting from the praise given by Sadolet to St. Augustine, by the omission of the word OMNIUM, Sadolet having written "*etsi ab ea stet doctor OMNIUM maximus*," &c. It is a singular coincidence, if both Annat and the writer quoted from the source, that both should make the same omission. Annat's fault, however, must appear small when we look at the writer's version, in which the words *doctor omnium maximus idemque gravissimus et sanctissimus vir* are rendered *Augustine*. Norisius next remarks that the words, "*si omnino a nobis nihil sit, quod valeat ad obtinendam gratiam*," are Semipelagian. This is evidently a just censure, for that which seems so repulsive to the feelings of Sadolet, is simply the doctrine of the Church that *grace is gratuitous*, according to St. Paul: "*Si autem gratia, jam non ex operibus, alioquin gratia jam non esset gratia.*" Rom. xi. 6.

Norisius proves at-length by five passages, quoted from Sadolet, and compared with the doctrine of Cassian and Faustus, that Semipelagianism is really expressed in his writings. But the writer's version of Sadolet's Semipelagian protest merits particular attention. The words "*durum admodum mihi videtur... si omnino a nobis nihil sit, quod valeat ad obtinendam gratiam,*" are rendered thus: "To him it appeared intolerable that Augustine.....should have asserted the theory of absolute election, according to which God bestows His grace on a few only, and abandons the rest of mankind to misery and perdition." Sadolet's protest is against *the gratuity of grace*: the writer admits the protest and identifies it with a protest against the doctrine of *absolute election*. Again, in identifying absolute election with the gratuity of grace he infers that if grace be gratuitous it is therefore granted only to a few! It is the writer, then, who protests against the theory of absolute election as being St. Augustine's: it is not Sadolet. Sadolet's protest is against the doctrine of the Church, which he attributes to St. Augustine as a harsh and repulsive opinion. Such a protest only establishes the Saint's orthodoxy.

We now come to something more resembling a "protest." Norisius taunts Annat for his want of observation in not perceiving that the learned and prudent Cardinal Gasper Contarenus had remonstrated with Sadolet upon his Semipelagianism, and that Sadolet, replying in a letter to the Cardinal, had used these words: "*Primum tibi prædico me in illa de libero arbitrio sententia non omnino assentiri Augustino, qui libertatem nostræ voluntatis perspicue aufert; dumque Dei gloriam maxime complecti vult, videtur mihi illi derogare aliquid potius quam quod videatur tribuere.*" He adds: "*Hæc si Annatus legisset dubio procul inter nobiliora contra S. Doctorem testimonia retulisset.*" What Annat would have done, had he read Sadolet's letters, the writer in the Rambler, who has read Norisius, has done; for the above words, furnished by the defender of St. Augustine, and employed as a taunt against Annat for quoting a Semipelagian, form the very strongest citation in this writer's Letter. But there is something curious in the manner in which he has introduced this testimony. For it is separated by two pages from the other Semipelagian passage which, though no protest at all, was brought forward with so much parade, and is thrown in, as though it were a thing of trifling importance, in the following off-hand way: "Whilst Sadolet, in his letters to his friends, openly avers that Augustine sacrifices the freedom of the will, the celebrated Dominican, Sixtus of Sienna," &c., and so he passes on to another writer. This is very curious. The protest, how-

ever, is of no importance, as it is nothing better than a calumny of the Semipelagians, repeated by one who is accused of holding their principles, and who utters it when replying to remonstrances made against his writings for expressing those principles. The evidence of the eight remaining witnesses is of light moment.

Sixtus of Sienna and Genebrard are adduced to attest that St. Augustine "sometimes ascribes to free-will less than its due." The text of Sixtus is not given; it occurs, however, in Norisius, who says of it, that St. Augustine himself would not have taken exception to it, as it asserts no more than he had himself admitted when expressing the difficulty he felt in speaking on the efficacy of grace without *seeming* to ascribe to free-will less than its due. The same observation applies to the text of Genebrard, which is given as follows. "Sic idem qui supra Augustinus fuit iniquior interdum libero arbitrio, quod Pelagianos haberet in procinctu, nihil aliud extollentes quam vires liberi arbitrii, Dei autem gratiæ minimum tribuentes." It is evident from this that Genebrard did not attribute to St. Augustine the intention of teaching that man is deprived of free-will. Norisius answers Annat, Adam, and Dechamps, who have all adduced these authorities, by opposing the words of Pope Hormisdas, *ep ad Possessorem*: "De arbitrio tamen libero et gratia Dei quid Romana, hoc est Catholica sequatur et servet Ecclesia, licet in variis libris B. Augustini et maxime ad Prosperum et Hilarium abunde possit cognosci," &c. It is clear that these writers impute none of the Jansenistic errors to the father, so that I need quote no more from this ample refutation by Norisius.

Ambrosius Catharinus is introduced with a splendid encomium; yet every young student of theology is familiar with his name by finding it attached to opinions that are *minus probandæ*. After his character we are favoured with his evidence, which, however, says nothing of the Jansenistic errors.

"From the experience he acquired in his controversy with the Protestants, he became so determined an enemy of the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, that he opposed it with twenty-five arguments in his commentary. He clearly and forcibly points out the novelty of St. Augustine's teaching; and refers to his admission that he could not answer one of the chief objections to it, and to the contradictions in which he involved himself, more particularly in his book *De Correctione et Gratia*."

And how did Catharinus oppose the Augustinian doctrine of predestination? By broaching a doctrine on predestination so far receding from St. Augustine's as to be irreconcilable with



that of the Church. Petavius has refuted him, *Theol. Dogm. De Prædest. Lib. ix. cap. ii. n. v.* Describing the doctrine of Catharinus (lib. de Prædest.) Petavius says: “Prædestinationem non nisi excellentium quorundam virorum gratuitam electionem esse dicit, quos Deus singulari prosequens amore, ex nulla præ-sensione meritorum sic ad vitam destinat, ut ab ea non possint excidere; cujusmodi fuit Beatissima Virgo, Apostoli, Prophetæ, et alii nonnulli; ceteros ait in communi providentia relictos, velut in suspenso manere, quandiu in vita sunt, ita ut salus eorum a potestate liberi arbitrii pendeat: *neque certus sit illorum numerus, ac determinatus in providentia Dei pro eo tempore, quo adhuc sunt in via*; (hæc enim illius verba sunt).....Quam sententiam ingenue fatetur S. Augustini sententiæ contrariam esse, a quo veniam idcirco precatur, nec sine tumultu ac reclamazione a multis exceptam; quod et Sixtus Senensis Catharini discipulus affirmat, libro 6. Bibliothecæ, ubi opinionis illius a se patrocinium propterea desertum asserit, cum decem propemodum annis eam publice prædicasset.” Vasquez, in *1am. disp. xe. cap. l.* modifies this doctrine, censured afterwards so severely by Petavius, but, *cap. ii. and iii.* he refutes many other errors of Catharinus’s system. He commences the third chapter thus: “Acriter invehuntur in Catharinum Dominicus Sotus, Antonius de Corduba et Bartholomæus Camerarius qui opinionem illius temerariam, contra scripturam, atque nota erroris dignam esse censent.” In the same chapter, referring to the terms in which Catharinus speaks of St. Augustine as contradicting himself, and to which the writer of the Letter has referred with so much satisfaction, Vasquez says: “Secundo contra Augustinum parum modeste loquitur Catharinus, et in illius sententiam suo modo explicatam maledictis procaciter fertur, asserens, ideo ab omnibus rejiciendam quod Episcopis Galliæ, et Massiliensibus, imo etiam multis per Africam summopere jam olim displicuisse teste Hilario Arelatensi, et Prospero Regiensi in Epistolis ad Augustinum. At in hoc turpissime certe Catharinus lapsus est: tum quod non intelligens mentem Augustini, ipsum impudenter impugnât et reprobat: tum quod ipse Augustinus contra Massilienses a Cœlestino primo in Ep. I. ad Episcopos Galliæ honorifice defenditur.”

We have already seen that the writer of the Letter has adduced Vasquez as being systematically opposed to St. Augustine; yet he ought to have seen the chief part of this testimony in Norisius’s answer to Catharinus. His opinion of Catharinus is widely different from that of Petavius and Vasquez, for he says: “The opinion of the Dominican Ambrosius Catharinus (Politi) seems to me of peculiar weight.”

Claude de Xaintes and Jerome Osorio are answered by Norisius in his answer to Catharinus. The quotations from them in the Letter are cited by Annat. They say no more than that St. Augustine's doctrine was new.

Cajetan is adduced by Annat and the Letter, but his remark has no weight. In order to excuse St. Thomas in a supposed error on a matter of mere philosophical speculation, Cajetan made the following remark in his notes. "Sustinent autem verba hanc glossam, quia quando contra Averröem erat sermo fas erat declinare in oppositum, ut Augustinus contra Pelagianos fecit." As this remark stands isolated, bearing no reference to any particular doctrine or passage of St. Augustine, as there is nothing to define in what way or degree Cajetan intended to say that St. Augustine inclined to the opposite, it merits only to be rejected as a gratuitous assertion. It certainly was not used by Cajetan with intent to convey an imputation of teaching "the dogmas of absolute election and reprobation, and of the infallible or irresistible action of grace."

The quotation in Annat and the Letter from Cornelius Mussus expresses, but with less force, the same idea as that of Cajetan. "Non ergo vos moveat Augustinus vel tantillum. Hoc est enim illi peculiare, ut cum aliquem expugnat errorem, tanta vehementia illum exaggeret, ut alteri opposito causam præbere videatur." The word *videatur* shows that Mussus did not impute to St. Augustine an *actual*, but only an *apparent*, leaning to the contrary side.

Valerius alone now remains of this formidable array of twenty-one witnesses. But his is a very gentle and respectful testimony. He says no more against the writings of St. Augustine than St. Peter said against the Epistles of St. Paul; "Sicut et carissimus frater noster Paulus secundum datam sibi sapientiam scripsit vobis, sicut et in omnibus epistolis, loquens in eis de his in quibus sunt quædam difficilia intellectu, quæ indocti et instabiles depravant, sicut et ceteras Scripturas, ad suam ipsorum perditionem." ii. Pet. iii. 15. In the same manner Valerius—"Beati Augustini scripta Clerici caute admodum legant. Ita enim acumine ingenii præstitit, et de rebus difficilibus tam subtiliter disputavit, ut non mediocri ingenio præditi viri ejus libros legentes in errores aliquando lapsi sunt." But I must again protest against the version of this passage given by the writer of the Letter, which misrepresents the meaning of Valerius; for he throws the blame of these men having fallen into error upon St. Augustine, and leads us to infer that his *doctrine* is in fault. He says: "He warns the Clergy to read the works of St. Augustine with especial caution, as very able men had been led

into error by them." He omits altogether the words which assign the reason for that caution, and which account for some men leading themselves into error. But, if Valerius had intended to lay the blame on St. Augustine he would have assigned as the motive for caution, not the power of his mind and the depth of his reasoning, but the danger of his doctrine. Yet it is to convict St. Augustine of teaching the blasphemous heresies of Jansenius that this proper and respectful admonition of Valerius is quoted.

My task is now accomplished. It has been shown that the Rambler's advocate defends the assertion—"St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism"—in the natural meaning of that scandalous proposition. It has been proved that his attempt to justify that assertion has utterly failed; that he has rejected the only process that could have led to a conclusive result, and that the pretended arguments on which he has depended, are wanting on every point. He undertook "to examine, concerning the doctrine of St. Augustine, the opinions of the most eminent among the older divines,—of men whose judgment has ever been of peculiar weight in the Church,"—and he stated boldly and positively, as the thesis to be proved by this examination, that "We shall find in the whole Church, from the sixteenth century downwards, a perpetual protest against Augustine's later theory of predestination, and of the consequent resistlessness of grace and denial of free-will." It has been seen that of the twenty-one authorities appealed to, there is not found one to support this bold proposition—not one so irreverent to the Saint, and so regardless of the deference due to the approbation of the Church, as to say that he, whom the Church has in every age revered as a Saint, and referred to as the faithful expounder of her doctrines on grace, has shamefully fallen into the hateful heresies afterwards condemned in the *Augustinus* of Jansenius. It has been proved that, to the grievous injury of some of the most esteemed divines of the Church, he has tampered most unfaithfully with their writings, has represented them as saying the very opposite to that which they actually do say, and has thus imputed to them the guilt of vilifying a Saint, of despising the authority and outraging the sense of the Church, and of violating the feelings of every devout Catholic. It has been shown that in every case in citing authorities he has made them support a scandalous proposition, than which nothing could be more remote from their intentions and the meaning of their words. The arguments, therefore, advanced by the writer of the Letter in support of this irreverent calumny uttered in the Rambler against a canonized Saint and Doctor of the Church, are a mere specious fiction unworthy of one who claims to be thought a divine.

The Editor of the Rambler has introduced this Letter to his readers with the following observations :

“ We are happy to enrich our pages with the following letter, which we have received from a divine of European reputation, both as a theologian and as a historian. We publish it, not indeed with any great expectation of reconciling our censurers to the expression which it defends, but chiefly because it would be a crying shame to permit so finished a piece of critical learning to be lost, and because we are loth to allow the unfounded accusations made against us to delude those who have hitherto borne us no ill-will, or to undermine our credit and cramp our independence by sowing suspicions of our orthodoxy. It is our right, as well as our duty towards ourselves and those who think with us, to prove that the denunciations made against us spring rather from the timidity of ignorance, the dogmatism of party views, or a ceremonious reverence to great names, than from such a knowledge of the subject in dispute as could give those who accuse us any right to sit in judgment on our opinions. We may at the same time suggest the possibility, that what is true in the present case has been more or less true in former instances where we have suffered from similar misrepresentations of our meaning, or from prejudiced condemnations of our views.”

In these words the Editor has disclosed with singular candour and unmistakeable precision, the estimation in which he holds the merits of the Letter, the ends which he has sought to attain by publishing it, and the results which, he assumes, its publication has secured. It has clearly achieved, to his entire satisfaction, the complete triumph of his cause, and the consequences attributed by him to the victory are numerous and momentous. The reader will, however, perceive that if there be any conclusiveness in the reasoning by which he draws those inferences from his supposed success, there will be an equal right to infer the opposite conclusions from his supposed failure. If, therefore, the assertion that “ St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism,” be untrue, and the arguments advanced to support it be nugatory, the Editor must admit, by parity of reasoning, that the results of his endeavours are the reverse of those which he believed to have been effected. It remains, then, with the reader to form his own judgment, and either to accede to the inferences of the Editor, or to draw for himself conclusions opposite to his, according to his verdict on the success or failure of the attempt made by the writer of the Letter to prove that “ St. Augustine was the father of Jansenism.”







BX  
4721  
G54  
1859

**THEOLOGY LIBRARY  
CLAREMONT  
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY  
CLAREMONT, CA  
91711**

DEMCO  
02/03

